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RETURNING TO PRINCIPLES OF
"FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE": THE ROLE OF
INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS IN
TOTAL REGULATORY TAKING CLAIMS
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court has difficulty determining when a
regulation is so excessive as to amount to an unconstitutional taking
under the Fifth Amendment. In making that determination, the Court
has failed to deploy an investment-backed expectations analysis as a
normative guide, even though the concept is part of at least one consti-
tutional test. Nevertheless, the Court's focus on principles of "fairness
and justice" suggests that the original, conceptual formulation of in-
vestment-backed expectations comports with the Court's normative tak-
ings philosophy. Using the extreme situation where a regulation com-
pletely eliminates a property's value as an analytical example, this Note
argues that the Court should expressly adopt an efficiency-fairness, de-
moralization cost approach to its investment-backed expectations analy-
sis in such a situation. In so doing, the Court should draw upon public
choice theory to supply administrable factors that indicate unconstitu-
tional government regulation because it already takes a similar, but im-
plicit, approach to takings claims.
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be
"taken for public use without just compensation."' That verb "taken" has
often been an amorphous puzzle. 2 The prohibition on "taking" has al-
ways been understood to reach uncompensated physical appropria-
tions, 3 but the U.S. Supreme Court extended it to regulatory burdens
in 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 4 Because most civil regula-
tions are imposed to counteract or supplant marketplace decisions, all
regulations to some extent reduce, or "take," some value from private
properties.5 The operative question is how to define when a regulatory
taking amounts to an unconstitutional regulatory taking.6
U.S. CoNs•r. amend. V (emphasis added).
2 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-39 (2005).
3 See id. at 537.
4 See id. at 537-39; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
5 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OE EMINENT
DOMAIN 3-5 (1985). But see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 11 l YALE L.J.
547, 554-56, 563-64 (2001) (arguing that although regulations -take" some property
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After the Court declared that a regulation that goes "too far" can
constitute a "taking,"7 it proliferated a myriad of tests to determine when
regulations are unconstitutionally excessive.8 The "polestar" remains the
analysis the Court announced in 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, which focused on three factors: the extent to which the
regulation diminishes the property's value, the regulation's interference
with the claimant's investment-backed expectations, and the character
of the government action.9 These three factors were not clearly defined,
but, after an interval of judicial uncertainty following the Court's 1992
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 1 ° they have evolved to
dominate a judicial weighing of constitutional fairness."
The Court's 2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. rejected
a means-end substantive due process analysis as an inappropriate Tak-
ings Clause litmus test. 12 In the wake of Lingle, commentators continue
to grapple with the ramifications of this latest regulatory takings pro-
nouncement. 13 Lingle reaffirmed the Court's tests announced in Penn
value, they also can give value-enhancing property entitlements for which the government
should extract payment from the grantee because all state-created externalities should be
taken into account).
6 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536-37 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987)) (stating that the Constitution does not pro-
hibit the government from taking private property but merely secures compensation in the
event of an otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking).
7 See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-39.
° 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
I° 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-19, 1026-32 (1992). In Lucas, the Court announced that com-
pensation will generally be awarded in the "extraordinary" case where a regulation de-
prives the claimant of "all economically beneficial use[]" of the property, except to the
extent that "background principles" of state law independently restrict its use. Id. For
years, courts struggled to understand whether Lucas created a new broadly applicable
standard, but, ultimately, Lucas has been relegated to those exceedingly rare cases where
regulations cause a total wipeout in value. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330, 332 (2002); Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 617, 626-29, 631.
II See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536-39.
12 Id. at 542-43. The Court noted that an inquiry into whether the regulation "substan-
tially advances" a legitimate state interest is an appropriate avenue to challenge the validity
of the regulation under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 542-43; id. at 548-49 (Kennedy. J.,
concurring) (stating that Lingle does not eliminate substantive due process challenges
under the reasoning of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfet, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)).
13 See, e.g., Jane R. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle,
and Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 634-52 (2007) (con-
tending that Lingle clarified Takings Clause doctrine and may signal a reconnection with
"constitutional culture"); Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Tak-
2008]	 The Role of Investment-Backed Expectations in Total Regulatory Takings	 867
Central and Lucas." Its focus on the reasons why compensation is
granted under the Takings Clause holds the most promise to clarify the
intricacies of takings challenges and ground them in constitutional
principle. 16 Nevertheless, many intricacies of takings jurisprudence re-
main unresolved. 16
One of the areas most in need of clarity is the "investment-backed
expectations" concept, which is now ensconced as the second prong of
the Penn Central analysis." That analysis has created "vexing subsidiary
questions."18 Not only has the Court been unable to apply a uniform way
of measuring investment-backed expectations, 19
 but it has also failed to
articulate a normative principle behind the analysis employed. 20 More-
over, there is disagreement about whether investment-backed expecta-
tions are an element of the analysis in the rare situation, identified in
Lucas, where the property's value is completely eliminated by regula-
tion. 21
This Note focuses on the intriguing question of how investment-
backed expectations operate to aid courts in determining—norma-
tively—when it is unfair not to compensate a property owner challeng-
ings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 899, 899-902 (arguing that regulatory takings law is
inherently a substantive due process matter); Mark Fenster, The Takings Clause, Version
2005: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CoNs .r. L. 667, 734-36
(2007) (stating that the Court in Lingle embraced a legal process approach to takings law),
14 See Link, 544 U.S. at 538-39; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
15 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (reasoning that the magnitude, distribution, and character
of private burdens are paramount considerations under the Takings Clause).
16 See Baron, supra note 13, at 646.
17 See 438 U.S. at 124.
18
 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. Such questions include, for instance, how to define the
denominator in the diminution in value fraction. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U,S. at 331-32, 335-
36 (affirming that the "'denominator' question" is analyzed by reference to the "parcel as a
whole," including geographic and temporal demerits, in an inherently factual manner);
Pa. Coat, 260 U.S. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Cane Tenn., Inc, v. United States, 60
Fed. Cl. 694, 700 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (stating that the denominator question is factual). An-
other question is how notice of a regulatory scheme that reduces the property owner's
expectations of future economic gain affects a takings claim. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-
33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19 See, e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18; id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
637 (Scalia, J., concurring); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, 132-35.
25 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
21 Sec 505 U.S. at 1017 (stating that a regulation that completely eliminates the prop-
erty's value is an "extraordinary circumstance"). Compare Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United
States (Palm Beach I), 231 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that investment-backed
expectations are not a part of the total taking analysis), with Good v. United States, 189
F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that investment-backed expectations are part of
every regulatory takings case).
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ing a regulation. 22 The Note's analysis takes on a particularly extreme
set of conditions—the rare situation identified in Lucas where a regula-
tion completely eliminates a property's value—as a diagnostic example
for examining the application of investment-backed expectations. 28
This analysis is thus limited to the narrow, if unlikely, situation where a
claimant alleges that a regulation has completely eliminated the prop-
erty's value because that situation provides the clearest example of the
principles involved in the normative analysis. 24
This Note argues that the text of the Lingle decision embraces the
original philosophy underlying the sometimes maligned, mostly mis-
understood concept and analysis of "investment-backed expectations." 26
Lingle tethers takings claims to their underlying antimajoritarian foun-
dations and focuses on the effects of regulation as applied to the prop-
erty owner, like the investment-backed expectations analysis as origi-
nally conceived by Professor Frank Michelman.26 In such an analysis,
compensation is due when a claimant demonstrates that a failed politi-
cal process left him or her shouldering an undue burden for the public
because the lost future productivity from the unfair imposition of the
burden is less efficient than simply compensating the claimant. 27 Al-
though this inquiry facially appears to require some mathematical value
calculations, public choice theory, which applies economic principles
to the policymaking realm, suggests helpful analytical tools courts can
use to detect those regulatory effects that indicate a need for compen-
sation.28
22 See infra notes 110-119,150-169 and accompanying text. This Note outlines some of
the disputes about defining what constitutes investment-backed expectations, but it leaves
that question aside as beyond its scope. See infra notes 134-149 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 235-239 and accompanying text.
24 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; infra notes 207-212 and accompanying text.
25 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43; Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of "just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,1213-15
(1967) (introducing the concept and analysis of investment-backed expectations in takings
law). Although the Court referenced Michelman's article in formulating its Penn Central
takings analysis, the article was not necessarily intending to supply a black letter constitu-
tional test. See 438 U.S. at 128; Micheltnan, supra, at 1250-52. Instead, Michelman was ex-
ploring theoretical ways to think about the normative aspects of regulatory takings analy-
sis. See Michelman, supra, at 1213-18,1248-52.
" See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-38, 542-43; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213-18.
27 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-39; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213-18; cf, John D.
Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. Erwin_ L. 8c Poet, 171,199-200
(2005) (stating that the government should compensate those property owners who have
been singled out to bear "severe, disproportionate economic burdens").
" See, e.g., Henry A. Span, Public Choke Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings
Clause, 40 InAno L. REV. 11, 13 (2003).
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Given Lingle's philosophical alignment with Michelman's normative
principles and the potential for public choice theory to supply adminis-
trable data for courts, the Supreme Court has the tools to analyze in-
vestment-backed expectations as originally articulated. 29
 Consequently,
the Court should clarify the role of investment-backed expectations by
adopting an analysis consistent with the original principles behind them
where the relevant considerations are most obvious: a case where a regu-
lation causes a total wipeout in value. 50
Part I outlines the major Supreme Court regulatory takings juris-
prudence, the policy behind the Takings Clause, and the conflict within
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit over the role of in-
vestment-backed expectations in a total taking claim. 31 Part II returns to
the first principles behind investment-backed expectations, demon-
strates how the Court has not applied those principles in its takings
cases, and outlines public choice theory as a way to bridge the gap be-
tween the Court and principle in this area. 52 Part III uncovers that the
Court, in prior cases, has implicitly analyzed takings challenges by ap-
plying an approach mirroring Michelman's investment-backed expecta-
tions philosophy and argues that the Court should now explicitly adopt
an investment-backed expectations analysis that comports with its foun-
dational principles.33
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS DECISIONS AND THE
CONFLICT OVER THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS IN A TOTAL TAKING CLAIM
Until the U.S. Supreme Court's 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, landowners could not be compensated for a taking unless
their property was physically appropriated by the government. 34 In
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court extended the scope of compensable takings
by holding that an unconstitutional taking occurs when a regulation has
29 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-39, 542-43; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1214.
" See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539, 542-43; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-19; Penn ant., 438 U.S. at
124; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213-18, 1234.
31 See infra notes 34-92 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 93-206 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 207-313 and accompanying text.
34 See 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1014 (1992); The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551-52 (1871); The Supreme Court—
Leading Cases, 116 14mtv. L. REV. 321, 321-22 (2002) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. The
physical appropriation rule retains vitality today: in cases where the government regulation
results in a physical invasion of property, compensation is categorically granted. See Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
870	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 49:865
gone "too far" in restricting the use of the property because, among
other things, the regulation impermissibly diminishes its value. 35 Al-
though the Court has decided many regulatory takings cases since Penn-
sylvania Coal, it has yet to articulate a clear rule for how far is "too far."36
A. Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence from Penn Central to Lingle
The modern regulatory takings test emerged in 1978, when the
Supreme Court, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, ar-
ticulated a three-factor analysis for regulatory takings claims." The
Court stated that the relevant inquiry is an "ad hoc, factual" one, focus-
ing on: (1) the extent of diminution in the property's market value, (2)
the extent to which the regulation interferes with "distinct, investment-
backed expectations," and (3) the character of the government ac-
tion." In that case, the Court ruled that a historic preservation ordi-
nance that prevented the plaintiff from developing air rights over
Grand Central Station in New York did not constitute a compensable
taking because the law allowed the established uses to continue, and
the restricted air rights were transferable to eight lots adjacent to
Grand Central Station." The Court, however, neither applied the test it
announced nor explained the factors, thus leaving takings law adrift.°
33 260 U.S. at 415-16. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes focused exclusively on the
extent of the diminution in value of the property as the barometer to distinguish regula-
tions that go "too far" from those that do not. Id. at 415. Holmes did not, however, limit
the scope of the inherently factual inquiry to diminution in value; indeed, diminution is
merely "[Ole fact for consideration" in determining whether the government breached
the limits of its regulatory power. Id.
36 See id.; see also Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1549, 1669 (2003) (stating that the Court "admits that its takings doctrines
operate without unifying standards or principles").
37 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
36 Id.; see Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213. The Court cited Michelman's piece in
formulating its test, and it remains the cornerstone of investment-backed expectations as a
legal concept. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127-28. Later, the Court changed the test, without
explanation, to the property owner's "reasonable" investment-backed expectations. See
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
39 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 107, 134-38. The obvious inference from these facts was that
the Court did not appear to think that the legislature placed a particularly heavy private
burden on the plaintiffs. See id.; see also infra notes 287-290 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing this issue in more depth).
40 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 134-38; Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 191
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 7-8 (2003); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. Indeed, in 1980, in
Agins v City of Tiburon, the Court stated an alternative, due process analysis of takings
claims, where compensation would be granted if the regulation did not substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The Court has expressly re-
jected the Agins test. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.. 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005). Until Lingle
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The Court complicated the mechanics of takings law in 1992, with
its decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which created an
alternative regulatory takings analysis to Penn. CentraA. 41 In Lucas, the
Court decided that David Lucas, a landowner with plans to develop va-
cant property he had purchased in a developed, beachfrout commu-
nity, was entitled to compensation after South Carolina passed a law
prohibiting construction of habitable structures on lots located within a
"critical area" for erosion control purposes. 42 The law rendered his
property "valueless."43 The Court held that where a regulation elimi-
nates all economically beneficial use, the property owner is entitled to
compensation without inquiring "into the public interest advanced in
support" of the regulation. 44 Thus, the Court expressly rejected the
third prong of the Penn Central analysis—the character of the govern-
ment action—and in so doing rejected a balance between the eco-
nomic impact on the individual and the public benefit conferred. 45 It
remains unclear, however, whether, as Justice Kennedy suggested in his
Lucas concurrence, a claimant who alleges complete value elimination
still must demonstrate that the regulation frustrated his or her invest-
ment-backed expectations. 46 Moreover, although Lucas suggests that
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., however, the Court was remiss in clarifying this area of constitutional
law. See id. at 537-38; Fenster, supra note 13, at 674-75.
41 505 U.S. at 1019.
42 Id. at 1006-09.
43 Id. at 1007.
44
 Id. at 1015.
45 See id. at 1015; id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J„ concurring in the judgment); Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124; Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States (Palm Beach II), 231 F.3d 1365, 1368-
69 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Gajarsa, j., dissenting).
46 See 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, j., concurring in the judgment) ("The finding of no
value must be considered under the Takings Clause by reference to the owner's reason-
able, investment-backed expectations."); Palm Beach II, 231 F.3d at 1368-69 (Gajarsa, J.,
dissenting); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that Lucas
"did not hold that the denial of all economically beneficial or productive use of land
eliminates the requirement that the landowner have reasonable, investment-backed expec-
tations"); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 n.5 (S.C. 2003) (stating
that "Lucas left much confusion . about whether ... 'investment-backed expectationsH •
survived"); see also Giulianna Ruiz, Comment, Informing Expectations Through Visual Cues:
Creating the Assurance of Justice in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 36 SETON HALL L. Ruv.
1309, 1324, 1339 (2006) (arguing that investment-backed expectations should be incorpo-
rated into a Lucas analysis because of the importance of visual cues in creating human
expectations). But see Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States (Palm Beach I), 231 F.3d
1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that, in a Lucas analysis, the "property owner is entitled
to a recovery without regard to consideration of investment-backed expectations"); Calvert
Chipchase, Comment, Lucas Takings: Why Investment-Backed Expectations Are Irrelevant When
Applying the Categorical Rule, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 147,462 (2001) (arguing that cases sus-.
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complete eliminations in value receive categorical treatment, the deci-
sion leaves a largely undefined exception to the rule: the state may
avoid paying compensation by showing that the proscribed use never
inhered in the claimant's title because it was prohibited by "back-
ground principles of the State's law of property and nuisance." 47 Thus,
Lucas presents an alternative test to Penn Central in complete elimina-
tion cases, but, for all of its definitive language, its contours are unde-
fmed.48
Attempting to eliminate residual inconsistencies in regulatory tak-
ings law and to clarify the applicable legal tests for regulatory takings
claims, the Supreme Court, in 2005, decided Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc.49 In Lingle, the Court rejected an award of compensation granted
because a state law capped the rent oil companies could charge to their
service station lessees on the basis that the regulation did not "substan-
tially advance []" a legitimate government interest and, thus, was a tak-
ing of the claimant's property. 5° The statute reduced the total potential
income Chevron could receive from renting its service stations but still
allowed it to earn a constitutionally permissible return on its invest-
ment." Lingle rejected the "substantially advances" test in takings cases,
even though the Court previously suggested that the test could deter-
mine compensation under the Takings Clause, because it was a means-
gesting that investment-backed expectations are part of a Lucas analysis misinterpret the
decision),
47 See 505 U.S. at 1029. Commentators have struggled to determine what constitutes a
"background principle" of state law and have suggested that the exception is too open-
ended to be valuable. Sec Lynn E. [Ibis, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering
Inherent Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1, 3-6 (1996). Indeed, framing property
protection in terms of limits based only on a historical baseline of state property law sug-
gests to some that the Court introduced—improperly—natural law protection of property
rights, which is inconsistent with a modern, legal positivist society, See Frank Michelman,
Property, Federalism, and fitrisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 W161.
Sc MARY L. Rev. 301, 307, 311-14, 325-25 (1993).
48 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; see, e.g., Slais, supra note 47, at 3-6; Joseph Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 49 n.75 (1964) ("Mt is highly dangerous to try to give any
qualitative evaluation of what are called nuisances. The category is an open and ever
changing one.").
See 544 U.S. at 540, 542.
5° Id. at 533-35. The claimed purpose of the statute was to protect independent gaso-
line dealers and promote competition, but the district court concluded that the statute
would not advance this state interest because the effect of the law would not result in lower
operating costs (thereby not lowering prices) and would induce . oil companies to increase
the wholesale price of gasoline in Hawaii to recoup lost rental revenue. Id.
51 Id. at 534.
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end analysis of the regulation's effects, not a measure of the burden
placed on the property owner.52
Lingle clarified takings law by making it clear that the Court views
regulatory takings claims through only three avenues of analysis: the
standard Penn Central takings analysis, and two per se rules, which apply
either when there is a permanent physical invasion of property or when
there is a complete elimination in value, as in Lucas.53 Although Lingle's
holding is not directly relevant to the doctrinal question presented in
this Note, the Court indicated that takings policy under the accepted
Lucas and Penn Central tests focuses on two major themes: the magni-
tude of the burden and the distribution of the burden among property
owners.54 These two themes unify the different takings tests because the
focus of all three takings inquiries is deciding when justice requires that
the state bear a burden that was unfairly placed on an individual. 55 The
Court's affirmation of these policy themes aligns it with commentary
regarding the purpose of the Takings Clause. 56
B. The Policy Rationale for Regulatory Takings Compensation
The Penn Central Court substantiated the policy animating takings
law: the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [is] designed to bar Gov-
ernment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."57 Although there is woefully little in the way of originalist evi-
dence for the Takings Clause, 58 most commentators accept the premise
that its purpose is to prevent majoritarian exploitation of individual
52 Id. at 542-43. The substantially advances formulation arose from another takings
case, Agins v. City of Tiburon, involving a municipal zoning ordinance. 447 U.S. at 260. The
Lingle Court rejected the due process analysis in Agins because its inquiry was directed at
whether the regulation is effective at achieving whatever its purpose is. Lingle, 544 U.S. at
542. This is not the function of the Takings Clause, which is aimed at requiring the public
to pay for property it takes from individuals in an unfairly burdensome way, even though
the regulation comports with constitutional due process. See id.
53 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; Penn Cent., 938 U.S. at 124.
54 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
55 Id. at 542-44.
" See id.; see also infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
57 See 438 U.S. at 123-24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40.49 (1960)).
58 See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Taking Justice and Fairness" Seriously: Distributive Justice and the
Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 571-72 (2006); Sax, supra note 48, at 58 (stating
that "contemporaneous commentary upon the meaning of the compensation clause is in
very short supply").
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property owners. 59 Similar protections from deprivation of property
date from the Magna Carta: government's taking of private property is
unlawful unless it is by "lawful judgment of [the landowner's} peers.'' 6°
Thus, what original evidence there is indicates that the constitutional
protection of property rights is cast in terms of fairness. 61 Yet, it is un-
clear whether the Court has employed an originalist interpretation of
the Takings Clause in the regulatory takings context, even though the
Penn. Central policy rhetoric appears to echo the policy concerns about
majoritarian exploitation, because it is not clear whether the Framers
intended that the Takings Clause extend to nonphysical appropria-
tions.62
Of the limited originalist evidence available, James Madison's Fed-
eralist No. 10 is the most apt statement regarding the reasons for includ-
ing the protections afforded by the Takings Clause: "[R]elief [from ma-
joritarian exploitation] is only to be sought in the means of controlling
its effects."63 Madison, however, did not advocate that the Takings Clause
should provide broad protection to property rights because the repub-
lican system of government itself—particularly at the federal level—
offers sufficient protection against factionalism and majoritarian ex-
56 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 4-6, 273, 281, 333-34; Blais, supra note 47. at 24 (stating
that "[t] he Takings Clause has long been understood to act as a shield between private
property owners and attempts by the majority to impose the burdens of public benefits on
a few individuals"); Claeys, supra note 36, at 1670; Gaba, supra note 58, at 570; Michelman,
supra note 25, at 1214-18, 1250; Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue
Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAI.. L. Rev. 561, 598 (1984); Sax, supra note 48, at 57, 60 ("[T]he
protection afforded [by the Takings Clause] is most properly viewed as a guarantee against
unfair or arbitrary government."); Span, supra note 28, at 78-79, 81; Kraig Odabashian,
Comment, Investment-Backed Expectations and the Politics of Judicial Articulation: The Reintegra-
tion of History and the Lockcan Mind in Contemporary American Jurisprudence, 50 UCLA L. REV.
641, 670, 672-73 (2002); William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Signifi-
cance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE, L.J. 694, 710 (1985); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 ( James Madison) (Cooke ed., 1961).
60 See Sax, supra note 48, at 59 (quoting Magna Carta, 1225, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29).
61 See id. at 59-60.
62 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24; William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Comm. L. REV. 782, 803-05 (1995) (stating that
the Court has not adopted an originalist understanding of the Takings Clause). The Court
seems to agree. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) ("The concepts of 'fairness and justice' that underlie the Takings Clause, of course,
are less than fully determinate.").
63 Tun FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 59, at 60; see Rose, supra note 59, at 588-89 (ar-
guing that Madison desired property protections to increase productivity from a utilitarian
viewpoint); Span, supra note 28, at 70-75; Treanor, supra note 62, at 836-54; cl Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Michelman, supra note 25, at
1212.
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ploitation.64 Indeed, he recognized that a natural consequence of gov-
ernmental exercise of power is an unequal distribution of benefits and
burdens among winners and losers in the political process; to provide
compensation whenever a decision changed a citizen's economic posi-
tion would be untenable. 65 Consequently, Madison viewed the Takings
Clause as serving two functions: (1) providing narrow protection to real
property owners who suffered disproportionately from a failure of the
political process, and (2) affirming to the public the principle that the
nation is committed to avoiding arbitrary redistributions of wealth. 66 In
short, the major rationale behind including the Takings Clause within
the Bill of Rights was a concern with addressing potential failures in the
political process, either by establishing an actual remedy or by express-
ing a philosophical commitment against arbitrary wealth redistribu-
tions.67
Some commentators have embraced this process-remedy rationale
for a contemporary regulatory takings jurisprudence. 68 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court itself has impliedly accepted the same policy goal in total
wipeout cases, stating that "it is less realistic to indulge our usual as-
sumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life — when the legislature forces someone to "sacrifice
" See TOE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 59, at 60, 63-64; Treanor, supra note 62, at
841, 843-44; see also Lingle. 544 U.S. at 543 ("[The Takings Clause] does not bar govern-
ment from interfering with property rights, but rather requires compensation 'in the event
of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.'" (quoting First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987))); Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413
("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."). Even early Eng-
lish commentators viewed property protection in the form of just compensation as a "bul-
wark against unfairness" or against the "imposition of loss by unjust means." See Sax, supra
note 48, at 56-57. Madison's Federalist No. 10 responded to concerns about factions—a
majority or minority with interests adverse to the remainder—unfairly imposing their will
on others. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 59, at 57-60. Madison's argument is that
a republican form of government is better than a pure democracy at controlling the ef-
fects of factionalism through structural, representative voting mechanisms. See id. at 60-64.
But it is not perfect, see id. at 62-63, and that is why the Constitution offers additional pro-
tection, see Treanor, supra note 62, at 838-40, 854.
65 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 59, at 58; Treanor. supra note 62, at 843; see
also Michelman, supra note 25, at 1178 (discussing practical inability of government to pay
compensation for every change in welfare because doing so would eliminate efficiency
gains of collective action).
e6 See Treanor, supra note 62, at 838-40, 854.
67 1d. at 855.
68 See WILLIAM A. FISCIIEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND Pourrics
289-324 (1995); Treanor, supra note 62, at 856, 863-64, 866-67.
876	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:865
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good."69
Thus, Justice Holmes's cryptic statement in Pennsylvania Coal that "a
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change" is given some substance: the majority
cannot benefit itself by arbitrarily placing a disproportionately severe
burden on a few. 7° Nevertheless, even if commentators (and the Court)
agree on why there is a Takings Clause, there is continual and funda-
mental tension about how the Takings Clause should operate to grant
compensation in practical terms. 71 The issue is how best to connect this
antifactionalism, anti-arbitrary government policy to a justiciable legal
construct that supports Madison's policy goals for the Takings Clause. 72
C. The Federal Circuit Conflict over the Role of Investment-Backed
Expectations
In Lucas, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a balancing of the
"public interest advanced" with the private burden of a regulation when
that regulation results in the complete elimination of the property's
value." Thus, when the first prong of the Penn Central test is proven to
be one hundred percent diminution in value, courts disregard the
"character of the governmental action."74 As Justice Kennedy in Lucas
noted, however, Lucas did not expressly repudiate the investment-
backed expectations prong of the Penn Central test."
69 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-19; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43.
7° See 260 U.S. at 416; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
CoLum. L. REv. 1689, 1690 (1984) (arguing that the Takings Clause is designed to prohibit
"naked preferences" of the majority).
71 See Rose, supra note 59, at 588-94 (noting that the fundamental tension is between
those who would protect the primacy of individual rights absolutely versus those who
would protect rights in light of civic-republican values and that, seemingly, the two cannot
be reconciled); see also Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property
Theory, 30 HARV. Env-rt.. L. Ray. 339, 349 (2006). Compare Michelman, supra note 25, at
1212-23 (espousing a civic-republican view protecting utilitarian rights), with ErsTEIN,
supra note 5, at 5-6, 331-50 (espousing a natural law view protecting individual rights).
72 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 59, at 60-64; Michelman, supra note 25, at
1213-18.
" See 505 U.S. at 1015 ("[A] t least two discrete categories of regulatory action [are]
compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of
the restraint.").
74 See id.; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25; Palm Beach II, 231 E3d at 1368 (Gajarsa, J., dis-
senting) .
" See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1039 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Penn Cent.,
438 U.S. at 124. Indeed, there is little debate that the petitioner in Lucas had a protected
expectation, meaning that he satisfied the threshold inquiry into investment-backed ex-
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In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Good
v. United States, denied compensation to a propertyowner who, after re-
ceiving several permits to fill wetlands on his property, was denied a re-
newal of a wetlands fill permit on Endangered Species Act grounds be-
cause the Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the project would
jeopardize certain endangered species on the propert 76 The claimant
alleged that the denial of the permit rendered his property valueless."
The court determined that because the property owner had notice over
a nearly twenty-year period of an existing regulatory scheme that made
the proposed project potentially difficult or impossible to complete, the
owner had not demonstrated that he held reasonable investment-
backed expectations." Thus, the Good court applied the threshold in-
quiry into investment-backed expectations and determined, essentially,
that the claimant was a speculator seeking a windfall." In the course of
its analysis, the court stated that "investment-backed expectations are an
element of every regulatory takings case."80
A different Federal Circuit panel, in a 2000 decision denying a
rehearing in Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States, disagreed with
Good's interpretation of the role of investment-backed expectations in
a total takings claim. 81 There, too, the claimant alleged that the denial
of a wetlands fill permit constituted a complete elimination of its
property value.82 In affirming its original decision in the case, the
panel reconsidered the role of investment-backed expectations in a
Lucas takings claim and determined that, contrary to the Good panel's
opinion,83 they are "simply not part of the analysis."84 This panel
stated that the Good panel was speaking generally about expectations
in regulatory takings law, but that its above-quoted language is dic-
tum.85 The Palm Beach panel interpreted Lucas as absolutely categori-
cal in its prescription for compensation in total wipeout cases, without
pectations. See 505 U.S. at 1006-07; Good, 189 F.3d at 1361. The Lucas Court later implicitly
relied on the primary demoralization cost inquiry of investment-backed expectations to
support its categorical rule. See infra notes 265-285 and accompanying text.
76 189 F.3d at 1357-60.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1361-62.
79 See id. at 1361.
88 Id.
81 Palm Beach I, 231 F.3d at 1364.
82 Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
affd on releg, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
82 See Palm Beach II, 231 F.3d at 1365 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
B4
 Palm Beach I, 231 F.3d at 1357.
ea Id. at 1361; Good, 189 F.3d at 1361.
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reference to investment-backed expectations." Dissenting from an
order denying a rehearing of Palm Beach en bane, Judge Gajarsa dis-
agreed with the panel's reasoning and wrote that investment-backed
expectations should be considered in a Lucas analysis.87
Thus, it is unclear whether the Federal Circuit has interpreted Lu-
cas as prescribing an absolutely categorical rule, without reference to
investment-backed expectations in complete elimination claims, 88 or as
altering the Penn Central analysis but preserving a role for investment-
backed expectations.89 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that
Lucas-type situations "generally" receive categorical treatment, but it
noted the exception to Lucas that a state's common law of property can
independently limit uses of property without compensation." Although
the Court uses the term "categorical" to describe the Lucas decision, it
is cognizant of the exceptions to Lucas that in fact make it not categori-
cal, and the Court has simply not addressed the role of investment-
backed expectations in the Lucas context.9t Indeed, Lucas itself explic-
itly rejected only part of the Penn Central analysis and was silent as to the
role of investment-backed expectations in its analysis."
II. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY: THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR CONSISTENCY
A. Returning to First Principles: The Origins of Investment-Backed
Expectations and Utilitarian Efficiency Justifications
for Compensation
Employing investment-backed expectations is one approach to
connecting the antimajoritarian fairness goals of the Takings Clause to
a justiciable legal construct that is also normatively superior." Professor
Frank Michelman's analysis of the takings issue remains the theoretical
88 Palm Beach I, 231 F.3d at 1364. But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); Palm Beach II, 231 F.3d at 1367 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
87 Palm Beach II, 231 F.3d at 1367 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
88 Sec Palm Beach I, 231 F.3d at 1364.
89 See id. at 1360-61, 1364; see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
99 See Link 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
91 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-19,1029.
92 See 505 U.S. at 1015. Moreover, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, when consider-
ing a different challenge to the same regulation creating the same total taking effect that was
at issue in Lucas, stated that neither Lucas nor Palazzolo clarified whether the investment-
backed expectations factor plays a role in total takings cases. McQueen, 580 S.E.2d at 119 n.5.
99 See infra notes 107-127 and accompanying text.
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framework and intellectual foundation underlying the concept of in-
vestment-backed expectations. 94 Indeed, Michelman coined the term
and the fairness-efficiency philosophy behind it. 95 The Supreme Court,
however, has neither explicitly adopted Michelman's analysis, nor has it
explained specifically the role of "investment-backed expectations" be-
yond merely incorporating the term as one factor in the ad hoc balanc-
ing test developed in 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.96
Although Michell-pan approaches the analysis from a utilitarian/
welfare economics vantage, he acknowledges that because takings in-
volve a deliberate choice to inflict loss on a member of society, fairness is
the only relevant "test" for whether compensation should be granted.97
Thus, Michelman's work is intimately linked with the fairness policy in-
forming the Takings Clause.98 In its course, Michelman's work connects
efficient social choices (i.e., those that result in a net social gain) to
ethical rightness." This subtle move is central to understanding the
proper role investment-backed expectations should play in a Takings
Clause analysis because this association is how Michelman connects tak-
ings law to the antimajoritarian policy behind it.'"
1. The Utilitarian Principles Behind Investment-Backed Expectations
Michelman posits that government must regulate in the market at
times to promote efficiency because information asymmetry, transaction
costs, and collective action problems inhibit free market efficiency.'°'
94 Michelman, SUPTTI note 25, passim; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New Ibrk City, 438
U.S. 104, 127-28 (1978); Fiscun, supra note 68, at 191-42 (stating that Michelman's arti-
cle "has dominated the academic discussion of the takings issue" and that "in)o other area
of constitutional law has such a durable leading article"); Mills, supra note 47, at 26 (citing
Michelman's "seminal exploration of the utilitarian issues" in takings law); Fred R.
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CIII.-KENT L. REV. 751, 767 (1996)
(listing Michelman's article as the twelfth most-cited law review article of all time).
95 S,re Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213.
" See 438 U.S. at 124, 127-28 (quoting Michelman's article in discussing the factors in-
volved in the balancing test).
97 Sec Michelman, supra note 25, at 1169 n.5, 1170-72. Michelman is joined by other
fundamental commentators, such as Joseph Sax, in this view. See Sax, supra note 48, at 60
(stating that the Takings Clause is a "guarantee against unfair or arbitrary government").
" See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1170-71.
99
 See id. at 1177-78, 1223.
1' See id,
101 See id. at 1179-77; sec also Eiss'rEitg, supra note 5, at 5.
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When government intervenes, it plays two roles: welfare-maximizer and
wealth-redistributer. 102
Government regulation of property touches the basis of wealth in
society because such wealth is generated from the social rules that se-
cure owners' expectations in reaping the benefits from their prop-
erty 103 Security is not absolute, however, because property owners un-
derstand the necessity for welfare-maximizing government regulation
so long as it is not arbitrary)" When the government regulates prop-
erty in a manner that diminishes its value without compensating the
regulated owner, the rules securing expectations change, and a redis-
tribution of wealth results. 1 °5 The legal inquiry is directed at determin-
ing when compensation must be gran ted." 6
According to Michelman, a necessary predicate to government ac-
tion that creates uncompensated losers is that the regulation be effi-
cient: it must generate a net welfare gain or else the regulation should
not be adopted.w7 The sufficient condition for noncompensated regula-
tion is that the inherent redistribution in such a case be fair in the sense
that it is an "accidental consequence" of an efficient decision, rather
than a deliberate choice to allocate loss to a narrow group of individu-
als. 108 In short, to regulate without paying losers (the creation of which
is an unavoidable effect of regulation), the government must act not
only as a welfare-enhancer, but also as a fair redistributer)( 1°
to See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1174-83.
103 See id. at 1211-12. The concept is that individuals realize that mutual respect of
property rights is required to accumulate wealth, so the law protects property rights to
allow those who have property to reap the '`fruits of [their] investment." See id. Otherwise,
the inherent self-interest in individuals would induce outright theft of others' wealth to
maximize personal gains; in effect, the strongest would win. See id. This utilitarian view of
the nature of property is the subject of extensive academic discussion with no clear resolu-
tion. See Bell & Parchomovsk); supra note 5, at 579-80 ("[T] here is no scholarly or judicial
consensus regarding the definition of property."); Rose, supra note 59, at 588-89. Many
commentators, however, accept that the Court evinces a utilitarian view of property. See
Claeys, supra note 36, at 1691-43; cf. Sax, supra note 48, at 61 (stating that "[p]roperty is
the end result of a process of competition" for economic resources).
104 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1211-13 (stating that individual property security
is "subordinate ... to [wealth] maximizing"); Sax, supra note 98, at 60. Not everyone
agrees. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 57-62,281 (stating that the Takings Clause is
absolutely an tiredistributive); Treanor, supra note 62, at 815-16 (discussing Epstein's view).
1°5 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1183,1212-13.
105 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 594 U.S. 533,539 (2005).
107 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1215.
ma See id. at 1183,1212-13.
09 See id.
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For Michelman, the investment-backed expectations inquiry in-
volves determining when the government is acting fairly by analyzing
three variables: efficiency gains, settlement costs, and demoralization
costs."° Efficiency gains are measured by a simple cost-benefit calcula-
tion applied to the regulation at issue.'" Demoralization costs are the
costs that arise specifically and only from the psychological realization
on the part of a loser in a redistributional choice that he or she will not
be paid as a result of that choice." 2 This realization results in a de-
crease in future investment and innovation because expected returns
from capital are less secure. 113 Settlement costs are the value the loser
would demand to avoid incurring demoralization costs.t 14
If both settlement costs and demoralization costs exceed the effi-
ciency gains, the regulation is inefficient and should be not be
adopted." 5 If the regulation is not inefficient and is implemented, gov-
ernment must incur one of these two costs, as they cannot both be
"paid," by definition." 6 Compensation should be required when, and
only when, "demoralization costs exceed settlement costs" because an
optimal utilitarian calculus would have society incur the lower of the
two costs." 7 Over time, social decisions made in this way should accord
benefits to participants on a roughly equal basis, and the political sys-
tem ensures that those elected will distribute such benefits equally or
they will be ousted from office."8 This compensation rule is the theo-
retical basis for the concept of "investment-backed expectations," but
the Supreme Court did not discuss how it viewed or defined invest-
11° Id. at 1214.
I" See id. An efficient policy choice simply results in more net gain than loss to society.
See id. These gains and losses, however, need not be monetary; economists may assign
monetary prices to intangible gains or losses. See id. Indeed, efficiency in Michelman's
formula is merely a balance of willingness to pay on the part of prospective policy winners
as against the insistence of prospective losers on a certain amount of compensation. Id. An
efficient choice would be, then, dictated by market-based principles: those who support
the change are willing to pay more than those opposed insist upon, and the change goes
forward. Sec id. Underlying the claim that such an outcome is efficient is that actors are
rational wealth maximizers and would only be willing to pay more for an outcome whose
benefits exceed its costs to those who propose it. See id. at 1213; see also FM11EL, supra note
68, at 142-44.
112 See Michelrnan, supra note 25, at 1214.
113 See id.
114 see id.
m See id. at 1215.
115 See id.
1x7
	 Michelman, supra note 25, at 1215; see also FISCHEI„ supra note 68, at 146-47.
a° See Micheirnan, supra note 25, at 1179; see also THE FEDER.Ausir No. 10, supra note
59, at 62-63.
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ment-backed expectations upon incorporating the concept in the legal
test in Penn Central) 19
2. Utilitarian Principles Connected with Fairness
Michelman does not stop with merely suggesting a utilitarian
compensation rule criterion because that alone does not determine
whether a result is fair; he argues that the utilitarian rule is equivalent
to a Rawlsian fairness test. 12° Rawlsian fairness is the idea that if the
process used to make decisions would be unanimously supported, and
if rational people would be comfortable being the recipients of the
worst outcome, the principles used are fair. 121
Two principles follow: first, society should not accord preferential
treatment to anyone; but, second, if preferential treatment exists, eve-
ryone should be able to be preferred at some point so long as, in the
long run, being preferred works out to be in everyone's advantage. 122
Because welfare maximization requires collective regulation, which re-
sults in unequal distributions, the first principle is not possible in soci-
ety. 123 The second principle, however, is equivalent to a compensation
rule that allows for losers and winners who will be roughly in parity over
the long-term, just as in the efficiency situation. 124 A rule that allows for
losers and winners is acceptable when it minimizes the occurrence of
demoralization costs by the payment of settlement costs when settle-
ment costs are lower than demoralization costs because losers can "ap-
preciate how such decisions might fit into a consistent practice which
holds forth a lesser long-run risk" of frustrated expectations. 125 More-
over, this Rawlsian framework dovetails with the necessary efficiency
condition in the utilitarian analysis because it requires that the pro-
posed project have demonstrable welfare benefits in that compensation
would be required where the worst-off position would be unacceptable
to anyone.I 26 Thus, because no one would be ready to accept a position
119 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-28; Gaba, supra note 58, at 589.
120 See William A. Fische! & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments
on Ike Economic Interpretations of Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 277 (1988)
("[Michelman] ... suggests, however, that the fairness and utilitarian criteria usually yield
the same rules for compensation."); Michelman, supra note 25, at 1219-24.
121 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1219; see also join4 Rawt.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE,
136-42 (1971).
122 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1220.
123 See id. at 1174.
124 See id. at 1222.
123 See id. at 1223.
120 see Id.
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where high demoralization costs are present, the Rawlsian test is func-
tionally equivalent to the utilitarian test. 127
Although it has been argued that investment-backed expectations
have no place in a takings analysis, 128 the fact that a utilitarian analysis
of regulatory takings comports so well with the fairness policy behind
the Takings Clause suggests otherwise. 129 Indeed, Justice Kennedy has
been a mindful and continuous supporter of investment-backed expec-
tations in his opinions on the takings issue. 13° Even in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, decided in 1992, the Supreme Court generally
assumed that the claimant had so obviously demonstrated that he had
investment-backed expectations that it did not need to address them. 131
Moreover, the Court has explicitly affirmed that the Penn. Central fac-
tors—including investment-backed expectations—are the "polestar" in
a regulatory takings analysis.'" Yet, for all these indications of their sig- .
nificance, the Court has neither expressly stated what it considers to be
the purpose of investment-backed expectations, nor has it defined the
concept.'"
B. The Incomplete judicial Application of Investment-Backed Expectations
1. The Court Rightly Attempts to Determine Whether a Protected
Expectation Exists
In applying investment-backed expectations in takings claims, the
Supreme Court has concerned itself with determining whether an ex-
pectation exists rather than with using the test as a way to distinguish
compensable from noncompensable takings claims by means of a de-
127 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1223; see also Gaba, supra note 58, at 591.
128 See Leading Cases, =Jim note 34, at 329-30.
In See Gaba, supra note 58, at 589-91.
IN See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,626 (2001); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003,1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgment),
151 See 505 U.S. at 1006-08; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; Good v. United States, 189 F.3d
1355,1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
132 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at
538-39.
133 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124;
Abraham Bell, Legal Transitions: Is There an Ideal Way to Deal with the Non-Ideal World of Legal
Change?, 131 CONTEMP. LEGAL. ISSUES 29,61 (2003) (TI-Jhe cases cannot be said to grant
any guidance on how to use the investment-backed expectation prong."); Dorernus, supra
note 40, at 7-8; sec also R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings
Law?, 9 NY.U. ENvirt.. L.J. 449,449 n.3, 453-59 (2001).
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moralization cost analysis. 134 As the Court has employed the test, the
function of investment-backed expectations is largely evidentiary: it is a
standard a plaintiff must meet to show what was taken, in dollar terms,
so that the Court may consider whether a takings claim exists. 135 Logi-
cally, the Court must require the plaintiff to make an objective showing
as to his or her expectations because value is inherently subjective, and
it is that value that is purportedly the subject of constitutional protec-
tion."6 Thus, the problem that has snarled commentary on investment
backed expectations is that an expectations requirement is inherently
circular because expectations are formed by the law, but the law pro-
tects expectations. 137
134 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-30, 634 (O'Connor, J. , concurring); Daniel R. Man-
delker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB, LAW, 215, 225 (1995); cf. Janet
Dunlap, Note, This Land Is My Land: The Clash Between Private Property and the Public Interest
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 33 B.C. L. REV. 797, 802-07 (1992) (discussing,
generally, different approaches to determining whether a protected right exists for Takings
Clause purposes). Indeed, as of March 31, 2008, a search for the term "demoralization
costs" in the LexisNexis "Federal & State Cases, Combined" database reveals that no fed-
eral court decisions have even employed the term, which is crucial to Michelman's analy-
sis, in a reported opinion. Exactly one court, in California, has employed the phrase-
properly—in its analysis. See Cmty. Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 916-17
& n.12, 918 n.15 (Cal. 1975).
135 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-30; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136-38; Jeremy Paul, The
Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1505 (1991).
156 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25 (citing precedent where takings cases were dis-
missed because the owner's lack of reasonable economic expectations meant that the
owner had no property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment); FISCHEL, supra note 68, at
50, 217 (stating that all values are deemed by economic theory to be subjective"); LyndaJ.
Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in
Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 108 (1995) ("[T] he Court has also used the word
'expectations' to refer to protected property interests."). The view that the Constitution
protects expectancy interests is the subject of a vast academic debate about the nature,
scope, and existence of property rights. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 579-80.
For a brief overview of the two sides in that debate, see Rose, supra note 59, at 588-97.
Compare EI'STEIN, supra note 5, at 3-6, 57-62 (advocating strong natural law property
rights), and Claeys, supra note 36, at 1670-71 (same), with Michelman, supra note 25, at
1211-12 (advocating utilitarian property protection norms). This Note does not attempt to
resolve the issue of the source of property rights in American law, Because this Note looks
only at investment-backed expectations, it assumes that for the purposes of investment-bathed
expectations alone, the constitutionally protected "property" is the owner's reasonable, in-
vestment-backed expectation. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1209-13.
137 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("There is an
inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of course; for if the owner's reason-
able expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of giivernmental
authority, property tends to become what courts say it is."); Mandelker, supra note 134, at
227; Paul, supra note 135, at 1505 ("[T]he more the Court's own pronouncements tend to
shape public expectations, the more the Court's reliance on these expectations threatens
to deteriorate into a blatant case of self-fulfilling prophecy.").
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The requirement that expectations be "investment-backed" does
little to clarify this circularity, although the terminology used suggests
that requiring expectations to be investment-backed serves a vital limit-
ing function.'" Were it not for this requirement, there would be no
upper bound on the potential value destroyed by a regulation because
any landowner would be able to assert that he or she expected to be
able to build an Empire State Building on every parcel, thereby frus-
trating .a reasonable, market-based valuation of "just compensation"
that may be required; the value claimed to be lost would be simply dis-
connected from reality.' 39 Requiring that expectations be investment-
backed avoids the problem of holdouts, which are economically ineffi-
cient, 140 and grounds society's duty to compensate in utilitarian princi-
ples because such a requirement protects only those expectations that
are the basis for the value of the property, not wistful, unilateral val-
ues."' Thus, investment-backed expectations act as an upper bound on
potential compensation.' 42
Moreover, the "investment-backed" requirement ideally would
avoid allowing speculators with notice to gain a windfall unfairly. 143 The
basic idea is the inverse to the upper evidentiary bound investment
backed expectations put on potential compensable values: a speculator
is° See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 ("'Government hardly could go on if to some extent val-
ues incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law ....'" (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)));
Michelman, supra note 25, at 1178 (stating that it is not possible to compensate for every
change in value because doing so would eliminate efficiency gains from collective action);
Paul, supra note 135, at 1505.
139 See FISCHEI„ supra note 68, at 50, 67-68, 211-12 (arguing that property rule protec-
tion, which gives the owner an absolute right to turn down compensation offered, is rea-
sonable in the private market context where one cannot be forced to sell, but liability rule
protection, which does require a sale but only compensates for fair market value, is appro-
priate in the government/eminent domain context because liability rule protection avoids
holdout problems); see also Mandelker, supra note 134, at 232-36 (discussing different ap-
proaches courts have used to avoid the subjective valuation problem).
140 See FISCii EI„ supra note 68, at 68-70.
141 See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) ("(A]
mere unilateral expectation ... is not a property interest entitled to protection."); Penn
Cent., 438 U.S. at 136-37 (stating that the regulation at issue was not a taking because it did
not interfere with the claimant's "primary expectation" for the use of its property and may
still allow the desired use, albeit to a lesser extent than the claimant may have initially
wanted); Michelman, supra note 25, at 1211-12, 1244; Oswald, supra note 136, at 115-16.
142 See Webb's Fabulous, 449 U.S. at 161 (disallowing a unilateral, subjective determina-
tion of property protection).
143 See Oswald, supra note 136, at 109-15 (summarizing and criticizing Michelman's
land speculator hypothetical);•sce also Micheltnan, supra note 25, at 1237-40 (introducing
the speculator problem).
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who buys land with notice of a potential regulation will pay a reduced
value for the land because the market has priced the regulation's ef-
fects into the sale value; thus, if the regulation comes to fruition, no
value is being unfairly redistributed from that speculative purchaser)"
Although some courts adhered to a strict "notice rule," where a pur-
chaser with notice of a regulation is per se denied compensation, to
prevent this scenario, 145 the Supreme Court, in its 2002 decision in Pa-
lazzolo V. Rhode Island, rejected the idea that notice of a regulation can
alone defeat a takings claim." 6 justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
in Palazzolo suggests that although the Court will not deny compensa-
tion based solely on notice, it will not ignore the existence of a regula-
tion either. 147 That is, the Court will conduct a factual inquiry into the
inherent fairness of the regulation to determine whether a protected
expectation exists) 48 Such an inquiry into the extent of the owner's
expectations surely adds fairness to the threshold question of whether a
protected expectation exists, but it does not complete the charge Jus-
tice O'Connor gave the Court: that investment-backed expectations be
used to determine whether compensation is due.'"
144 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1237-40; see also Mandelker, supra note 134, at
243-44 (supporting a regulatory risk regime for takings whereby owners with notice of
regulations assume the risk of regulation upon purchase).
145 See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir.
1994); see also Mandelker, supra note 70, at 243 n.111, 246 n.124 (discussing courts employ-
ing this rule).
146 See 533 U.S. at 627-28 ("Were we to accept the State's rule [that notice defeats a
takings claim], the postenactment transfer of title would ... put an expiration date on the
Takings Clause.... A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right
when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compen-
sate for what is taken.").
147 See id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148 See id. (stating that if notice does "nothing to inform the analysis, then some prop-
erty owners may reap windfalls and an important indicium of fairness is lost"); cf. Fischel
Shapiro, supra note 120, at 290 (stating that accepted practices and "unspoken under-
standing" may transfer property rights to government without the need for compensation
even when there is notice); Michelman, supra note 25, at 1237-40 ("[S]ocial action which
merely corrects prior, unilaterally determined redistributions, or brings a deliberate gam-
ble to its denouement, raises no question of compensability."). Such an analysis, however,
is inherently subtle and fact-intensive. See Oswald, supra note 136, at 110.
145 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
130 (stating that merely showing that a regulation prevents exploitation of an expected
property use is alone insufficient to justify compensation). Justice Scalia would not allow
notice of a regulation to have any bearing on the existence of the owner's investment-
backed expectations. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring). Instead, he
would require compensation when the government impermissibly burdens property, re-
gardless of whether the claimant was on notice of the challenged regulation, because the
prevention of windfalls to savvy speculators betting on the unconstitutionality of a regula-
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2. The Court Fails to Apply Normative Analysis
Despite these, and other,' 5° difficulties with determining whether a
legitimate expectation exists,'" courts must nevertheless make that de-
termination if they are to engage in an investment-backed expectations
inquiry that is true to Michelman's analysis. 152 Quite rightly, courts are
concerned with making this initial determination to prevent specula-
tors from securing a windfall, for example.'" Nevertheless, the preven-
tion of windfalls to speculators, among other difficulties, is a prelimi-
nary or side issue that, although important from a policy perspective, is
not the central thrust of Michelman's investment-backed expectations
analysis. 154
Indeed, the preceding discussion and its subsidiary issues are logi-
cally antecedent to the question of whether a takings claimant should be
compensated because the prior discussion merely answers the question
of whether the claimant can be compensated (i.e., was there anything
the government could have taken?). 155 In Penn Central, the Court never
Lion is no less unfair than stock market speculation because the only "harmed" party is the
government. See id. at 636-37. Although Justice Scalia is correct that the purpose of wind-
fall prevention is not to condone unconstitutional government regulation by giving the
government a free pass when an owner has notice, the problem with his argument is that if
an investment-backed expectation analysis is to determine whether compensation should be
granted, the fairness inquiry behind the analysis turns on whether the claimant incurred
sufficient demoralization costs so as to necessitate compensation. See id.; see also supra notes
110-119 and accompanying text. It is hard to see how a speculator would be demoralized
by the failure of his or her gamble; the timing of the purchase, then, must have some im-
port in the analysis. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1237-40.
15° See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
331-32,335-36 (2002) (dealing with "'denominator' question" in determining diminution
in value); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-33 (O'Connor, j., concurring) (dealing with the im-
pact of notice on expectations). This Note does not suggest a resolution to these questions.
See infra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
15 I See Paul, supra note 135, at 1518 (stating that the Court must expressly indicate the
type of expectations it is going to protect, but it refuses to do so); Dunlap, supra note 134,
at 807. This is largely due to the fact that the nature of what is 'property" is an unresolved
question. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas V. South Carolina Coastal Council: it Tangled Web of
Expectations,.45 STAN. L. REV. 1369,1392 (1993) (stating that problems with the Takings
Clause exist because of "muddled conceptual foundations").
152 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1211-18; Paul, supra note 135, at 1506 (stating that
asking whether an expectation exists or is reasonable restates the question and does not
determine whether compensation is due).
153 See, e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Good, 189 F.3d at
1361.
Sec Michelman, supra note 25, at 1238-39; cf. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-28.
155 See FISCIIEL, supra note 68, at 185 ("The question in takings is normative."). Rut
Fischel acknowledges that "expectations are an important part of a normative theory of
property" because, if property is defined as a "basis of expectation," an expectation must
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reached the should question with respect to whether the regulation frus-
trated the claimant's investment-backed expectations, but it held that
the claimant retained its primary expected use (as a train station) and
that the regulation did not foreclose all possibility of air rights devel-
opment. 156 Therefore, the claimant demonstrated that it was potentially
due compensation because it had expectations to build above the sta-
tion, but the Court simply did not engage in the next step of the in-
vestment-backed expectations analysis; it merely stated that the claim-
ant retains a "reasonable beneficial use." 157
In failing to discuss investment-backed expectations explicitly, the
Penn Central Court left the contours of investment-backed expectations
undefined.os That said, Penn Central suggested that another step logi-
cally follows, even though the Court did not take it, when the Court
held that property owners may not establish a taking by merely showing
that they cannot "exploit a property interest that they heretofore had
believed was available for development." 159 Even the recent Palazzolo
opinion, which dealt squarely with the issue of investment-backed ex-
pectations, did not state the normative inquiry the Court undertakes
within an investment-backed expectations analysis. 160 Rather, it clarified
the notice rule issue, ruling that the claimant indeed had a potentially
compensable claim even if he had notice of the regulatory burden on
his property, and remanded the case to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. 16 ' As it stands, the Court has never explicitly delved into a de-
exist before it can be taken. See id.; see also Michelman, supra note 25, at 1211-12, 1239
(stating that legal protection for property is important in the utilitarian view because
property is merely the law governing the interrelationships in society between people and
resources as to who has access to what "fruits"). Clearly, a natural rights view of property
rights is diametrically opposed. See FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 171-74. One perspicacious
judge on the Court of Federal Claims recognized the antecedent nature of the existence of
a property interest to the question of whether that interest has been taken, even though he
thinks that expectations play no role in determining whether an interest exists. See Store
Safe Redlands Assoc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726, 734 (Fed. Cl, 1996), quoted in Steven
J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of "Investment-Backed Expectations," 32 UR n. LAW. 437, 443 (2000).
Indeed, Justice O'Connor recognized that the investment-backed expectations test is de-
signed to determine when the government should compensate for an otherwise valid
regulation, even though she did not address the question of the nature of what the right
taken exactly is. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 a.* (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Lingle,
544 U.S. at 543 (O'Connor, J.).
tae
	 438 U.S. at 136-38 & n.36.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 124; Radford & Breemer, supra note 133, at 455-59.
159 See 438 U.S. at 130.
160 See 533 U.S. at 626-29, 632.
16 ' Id.
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moralization cost analysis, which is the key normative component of
Michelman's thesis, and which connects it to the ultimate policy behind
takings: fairness. 162
The Court, then, has suggested a two-step inquiry by using an aca-
demic term of art, investment-backed expectations, in its legal test. 163
The Court, however, has been unable to move beyond the preliminary
issue of whether an expectation exists to the normative issue at play in
the concept of investment-backed expectations: whether the demorali-
zation costs of the regulation demonstrate that the claimant should be
compensated.'"
With this picture of the landscape, it should not be surprising that
the Court has failed to mention demoralization costs; to measure such
costs, it is necessary to have a firm concept of the nature of the rights
whose loss requires compensation.I 65 The Court may be forgiven in its
omission because even economists have "no obvious metric" to measure
such psychological impacts on uncompensated parties. 166 For all of the
theoretical appeal and rhetorical vitality of Michelman's takings test, its
dubious administrability inhibits its direct application in a litigation
context. 167 Nevertheless, such an inquiry is empirically supported by
public choice theory and welfare economics because requiring com-
pensation under a demoralization cost rubric is efficient. 168 That it is
162 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1250; see also supra notes 57-72 and accompanying
text.
les See Penn Cent., 938 U.S. at 129; Good, 189 F.3d at 1360-61. The two part inquiry is as
follows: (1) does the claimant have an expectation entitled to constitutional protection?,
and (2) is this claimant deserving of compensation because the regulation has excessively
appropriated his or her property (i.e., the regulation has gone "too far")? See Lingle, 544
U.S. at 539, 542; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, 127-28; Pa. Can&
260 U.S. at 415-16; Store Safe Redlands, 35 Fed. Cl. at 734; Michelman, supra note 25, at
1213-18. It is the second prong of the above inquiry that is truly the focus of investment-
backed expectations, as evaluated using Michelman's demoralization cost framework. See
Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213-18.
164 See Mandelker, supra note 134, at 225-26; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213-14; cf.
Fische] & Shapiro, supra note 120. at 278 (taking the position that commentators have
misinterpreted Michelman 's analysis).
165 See Paul, supra note 135, at 1538-39.
166 See FISCIIEL, supra note 68, at 217.
167 See Fenster, supra note 13, at 695,712 (stating that the Court has "failed to develop
analytical or operational tools" to inquire into fairness in a takings analysis and speculating
that the Court "may have determined that a utilitarian approach is too indeterminate to
adopt"). Michelman himself implicitly recognizes this problem. See Michelman, supra note
25, at 1248-50; see also FiscnEt., supra note 68, at 142 ("Michelman wanted to explore phi-
losophical ways of thinking about the taking issue.").
ma Sec Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 120, at 269,292 ("Michelman's utilitarian stan-
dard offers a method for evaluating compensation questions that is consistent with princi-
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also fair makes demoralization cost analysis a vital tool for courts in
making compensation determinations. 369
C. Public Choice Theory, Legal Process Approaches, and Overcoming the
Administrability Hurdle of Demoralization Costs in
the Normative Analysis
The key to accessing the core demoralization cost inquiry in an
investment-backed expectations analysis lies in finding a sufficient, liti-
gation-ready proxy for demoralization costs because they are otherwise
difficult, if not impossible, to determine. 170 A legal process inquiry,
viewed through the policy lens of James Madison's admonitions against
majoritarian exploitation, provides a necessary proxy for the Supreme
Court to articulate a realistic approach to the actual fairness question
involved iii investment-backed expectations)" Additionally, certain as-
pects of public choice theory significantly inform a process inquiry that
comports with the thrust of the utilitarian approach and with the policy
behind the Takings Clause)"
Public choice theory is the application of economic supply and
demand welfare maximization principles to the political/collective ac-
tion context, where government supplies "goods" in the form of certain
pies of economic efficiency."); see also supra note 111 (discussing efficiency as an outcome
with more benefit than detriment, in general terms).
169 See FISCIIEL, supra note 68, at 216-17 (stating that economics alone cannot be the
basis for normative legal rules in the takings analysis because "the issue involves fairness as
well as efficiency"); Michelman, supra note 25, at 1219-23,1250.
17° SeeFiscHEL, supm note 68, at 148-49,164-65,180-82.
171 See id. at 148-49 ("The source of the demoralization cost for Michelman was the
risk of 'majoritarian exploitation.'"); see also Baron, supra note 13, at 646-48 (stating that
demoralization costs flowing from unfair regulatory decisions are the heart of the Takings
Clause); Fenster, supra note 13, at 694 ("[T)he Takings Clause's fairness rationale serves to
protect the victim of a failed political process that has left her vulnerable to exploitation by
a majoritarian decision."); Span, supra note 28, at 13 (stating that "the primary rationale
for the constitutional protection of property rights is the existence of flaws in the decision-
making processes" of a democracy).
172 See Fiscitra., supra note 68, at 216-27; Baron, supra note 13, at 646-48; Rose, supra
note 59, at 598; Treanor, supra note 62, at 866-72. Not all commentators agree that public
choice theory should play a role in takings issues. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Gov-
ernment Pay: Markets, Politics, and the allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Cm. L. REV. 345,
345-48,374-77 (2000) (arguing that the application of public choice theory to takings
may create "perverse" effects in terms of deterring inefficient policy because governments
do not respond to market incentives like private actors); Span, supra note 28, at 58 (stating
that public choice theory has laudable goals but cannot do what it sets out to accomplish
because the political process will never be perfectly optimal).
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policy outcomes to the consuming "market" of voters. 173 The obvious
corollary to this model is that representative governments can fail when
majorities control policy demand because minority groups are unable
to provide sufficient demand for their preferences to induce a policy
supply. 174 Public choice theory posits that this situation can occur in
several ways, the most relevant of which are interest group politics and
majoritarianism."5 Although public choice theory merely presents an
analytical framework, not a legal rule, these two situations are potential
sources of demoralization costs that a court may heed in undertaking a
process review. t76
1. Interest Groups as Sources of Demoralization Costs
Interest group politics occurs when groups with similar policy de-
mands band together to lobby government for a certain policy out-
come.'" The rub is the free rider problem: a rational wealth-
maximizing individual will not pay for the provision of a good unless he
or she is forced to do so to procure it, so that individual counts on the
efforts of others in the group to carry the burden of providing the
good for the benefit of everyone, including members who do not pay
(i.e., free riders). 178 The free rider problem causes larger groups of pol-
icy consumers to be at a competitive disadvantage in the market for pol-
icy goods relative to small groups because a small group's players have a
stronger individual interest in the outcome and reduced transactional
costs to organize, thereby minimizing the potential for free riding. 179
Commentators have identified two process failure risks created by
interest group politics as it relates to takings compensation.m First, an
interest group may be able to lobby government for compensation to .
173 See Span, supra note 28, at 13; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Fricke); Public
Choice Revisited, 96 Mien. L. REV. 1715, 1715, 1717 (1998). The field is far from unified,
and academic debates about the way and extent to which public choke theory applies to
real world situations continue. See Farber & Frickey, supra, at 1717 (providing a brief over-
view of the field).
174 See Span, supra note 28, at 22-27, 40-41, 50-51; Treanor, SUPS note 62, at 856, 866-
67; cf. Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences of Uncom-
pensated Land Used Controls, 49 B.C. L. REV. 301, 337-38 (2008) (stating that governments
are economic actors and respond to supply/demand incentives).
175 See Span, supra note 28, at 22-27, 40-91, 50-51.
176 See id. at 13-14. This Note does not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of
the public choice field.
177 See id. at 24-26.
148 See id.; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 173, at 1717-18.
179 See Span, supra note 28, at 29-26; see also Farber & Fricke); supra note 173, at 1717-18.
180 See Span, supra note 28, at 27-28.
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itself when it should not actually be provided—that is, when it would be
more efficient for the government to incur demoralization costs. 181
Second, an interest group, even though it can organize, is not a repeat
player, so it has insufficient influence on the policy market because pol-
icy suppliers are simply unresponsive to demand from one-time play-
ers. 182
That said, interest group participants may not suffer from a lack of
political voice, meaning that they do not suffer demoralization costs be-
cause the psychological impact of a regulation passed over their heard
objections is less severe. 183 Moreover, any special interest-backed policy
result that effects a taking from majority outsiders will be, by definition,
widely dispersed.' 84 Therefore, the interest group problem may not be a
major issue in investment-backed expectations jurisprudence because it
avoids one major constitutional concern—ensuring that regulatory
burdens are not overly concentrated 185—and, at worst, results in negli-
gible demoralization costs. 186
2. Majoritarianism: The Gold-Standard for Demoralization Costs
Majoritarianism is a potentially relevant concern in an investment
backed expectations analysis because it can result in singling out indi-
viduals to bear a burden for the benefit of the whole. 187 This situation
arises where the majority is relatively homogeneous, such that majority
individuals' policy demand preferences align (to the exclusion and det-
riment of minorities), and where the majority exercises control over
immobile property; such that the economic threat of exit is not lever-
agable in the economic policy contest. 188 Thus, minority demand for
policy is not a relevant consideration in a decision-making process be-
181 See hi.; see also Adler, supra note 174, at 350-51.
182 See Span, supra note 28, at 27-32; see also Adler, supra note 174, at 350-51.
188 See FISCIIEL, supra note 68, at 139,157,316-17 (stating that losers in special interest
politics do not suffer from particularly severe demoralization costs because they have a
voice and that special interest politics has virtue in allowing participants to self-protect).
Lai See id.
188 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544 (stating that plaintiff should show that it is being "singled
out" to shoulder a severe regulatory burden); Span, supra note 28, at 32-33.
188 See FISCIIEL, supra note 68, at 157.
187 See Span, TOM note 28, at 41; cf. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (stating that a taking occurs
when a property owner "sacrifice [s]" all property value "in the name of the common good").
1811 See FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 182; Treanor, supra note 62, at 866-67; cf. Clive Crook,
Housebound, ATLANTIC Monnitx, Dec. 2007, at 22 (discussing studies suggesting that
homeowners "tend to act as cartels" when voting for and implementing regulations in
their communities).
2008]	 The Role of Investment-Backed Expectations in Total Regulatory Takings	 893
cause that demand has no ability to attract policy supply through either
votes or economic threats.'"
Typically, larger units of government present a lower risk of q ajori-
tarian exploitation for two reasons. 19° First, interest group politics works
to allocate preferences fairly when competition for policy demand is
broad enough because that demand makes the policy "market" respon-
sive. 19' Second, demoralization costs are unlikely to result from higher-
level legislative actions because of the inherent protections Madison en-
visioned in a republican system where policy decisions are likely to be
felt by a widely dispersed group of constituents.'" Therefore, local gov-
ernment poses a greater majoritarian risk: efficient choices (in the case
of takings, to compensate to avoid demoralization costs) are eschewed
in favor of majority preferences because the majority suffers no reper-
cussions for doing so.'" This risk presents the potential for uncompen-
sated demoralization costs that exceed settlement costs, and courts have
a role to play in avoiding this circumstance by way of the investment-
backed expectations inquiry.'"
Public choice theory, therefore, suggests helpful analytical frame-
works for courts to determine when demoralization costs are likely to
exceed settlement costs, and when they are also likely being improperly
ignored by policymaking bodies.'" Thus, viewed in light of Michelman's
philosophy behind investment-backed expectations, these sources of
high demoralization costs offer themselves as an administrable way to
fashion an investment-backed expectations test that would determine
whether the process singles out individuals to bear a disproportionate
share of society's burdens.' 96
199 See FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 131-32, 139-40; Adler, supra note 174, at 337-38.
199 See FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 131-32,139-0; see also Rose, supra note 59, at 598.
191 See FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 316-17; Span, supra note 28, at 41-42.
192 See Rose, supra note 59, at 598.
193 See Span, supra note 28, at 42-44; Treanor, supra note 62, at 867. This is true a forti-
ori with real property because minorities have no political voice and no threat of economic
exit: they cannot move their property elsewhere. See Ftscum, supra note 68, at 324. Nei-
ther Span nor Treanor, however, agree that this situation should be the touchstone for
situations where compensation is required. See Span, supra note 28, at 44-48 (disagreeing
because even if majoritarian risk exists, a separate "normative principle" must be employed
to determine whether to compensate); Treanor, supra note 62, at 868 (disagreeing because
local decisions can be reviewed at the state level).
194 See FISCIIEL, supra note 68, at 139,182.
193 See id. at 217.
198 See id. at 139.
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3. Public Choice Theory, Process Review, and the Takings Clause
Some recent commentary suggests, however, that the Supreme
Court has adopted a legal process approach to takings jurisprudence
but that such an approach is at odds with public choice models. 197 It is
clear that there is a distinction between a legal process approach (in
the sense that John Han Ely uses the term) I98 advocated by some theo-
ristsi" and a "substantially advances" due process or equal protection
inquiry, which the Court, in its 2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., explicitly rejected as antecedent to a takings analysis. 2" Lingle,
however, does not prohibit an inquiry into failed processes as they re-
late to magnitude and distribution of the burden, as opposed to the
validity of the regulation itself"' Although Lingle admittedly focuses on
the effects of a regulatory burden, it does so because of the nature of a
takings inquiry in a regulation as-applied situation: a court must review
the effects of the regulatory scheme because there is nothing else it can
logically do. 202 The relevant question, then, is whether the magnitude
197 See Fenster, supra note 13, at 700-01, 713, 738-39 (stating that the "process itself is
not the subject of takings claims").
198 See generally JotiN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
199 See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 324; Fenster, supra note 13, at 739-44. Such a le-
gal process approach focuses on court oversight of the procedures used by the government
body to arrive at its decision. See FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 139-40; Fenster, supra note 13,
at 733-34, 738-40.
200 See 544 U.S. at 543; Fenster, supra note 13, at 735-36. Indeed, a regulation that fails
a due process challenge is simply invalid because "[silo amount of compensation can au-
thorize such action." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543. The Lingle Court made it clear that a "substan-
tially advances" due process inquiry is unrelated to the takings question because it is a
"means-end" test to determine whether a regulation achieves a proper public purpose; a
test to determine when a taking is unconstitutional inquires as to when the public should
bear the burden for regulations that impose a concentrated and intense burden that is
functionally equivalent to a physical appropriation. See id. at 542-43.
2" See 544 U.S. at 542-44. Indeed, Justice Stevens, in 1985, in Williamson County Re-
gional Planning Commission u Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, suggested as much in the tem-
porary takings context: "Even though these controversies [over regulatory limits on prop-
erty uses] are costly and temporarily harmful to the private citizen, as long as fair proce-
dures are followed, I do not believe there is any basis in the Constitution for characterizing
the inevitable by-product of every such dispute as a 'taking' of private property." 473 U.S.
172, 205 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
2" See 544 U.S. at 542-44; Baron, supra note 13, at 646-48 (stating that Lingle identi-
fied factors that indicate demoralization costs, which "underlie() Americans' concerns
about the Takings Clause" (i.e., the "why me" question)); Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1690
(stating that the Takings Clause is directed at protecting against government actions moti-
vated by an improper purpose, but that effects may be relevant to show such a purpose); cf.
Eagle, supra note 13, at 899, 910-16 (arguing that Penn Central is itself a substantive due
process analysis in reviewing regulatory effects).
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and distribution of the effects of a:regulatory burden are sufficient in-
dications of a failed political process, which resulted in high demorali-
zation costs that should have been compensated ex ante because the bur-
den that the process imposed is unfair. 203 Public choice theory suggests
that those effects can indicate a process failure. 204 Thus, a legal process
approach can and should be coextensive with a public choice theory
proxy for demoralization costs. 205
Properly understood as favoring compensation when demoraliza-
tion costs exceed settlement costs, the investment-backed expectations
analysis is the vehicle the Court can use to undertake a normative legal
process evaluation to determine fair and efficient compensation results
under the Takings Clause. 2°6
III. EMBRACING ECONOMIC NUANCE WITHOUT NUMBERS: How THE
COURT CAN—AND SHOULD—APPLY INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS ANALYSIS IN TOTAL TAKINGS CLAIMS
Prior to the 2001 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island case, the U.S. Supreme
Court's takings decisions were notoriously unclear as to what invest-
ment-backed expectations are. 207 Although Palazzolo did much to clarify
how courts should determine whether a claimant has proven that an
expectation exists so as to avoid rewarding speculators,208 it did little to
shed light on the normative aspects of the doctrine. 209 The Court's
2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. went beyond deciding the
narrow question before it and significantly clarified both the purpose
and normative principles underlying Fifth Amendment takings juris-
prudence. 21° Neither Lingle nor Palazzolo, however, resolves the contro-
versy about whether investment-backed expectations are part of every
regulatory takings decision, particularly in the context of a total taking
205 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-44; ef. Michelman, supra note 25, at 1245-50.
2°4 See supra notes 170-196 and accompanying text.
206 See FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 216-17; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1219-23; Sun-
stein, supra note 70, at 1690, 1692-93; c.f. Eagle, supra note 13, at 947-50 (arguing for a
substantive due process review of takings claims to promote property rights). The central
analytical point is that if one accepts the contention that economics can provide courts
with empirical evidence of efficiency in decision-making processes, see F rsctIEL, supra note
68, at 216-17, then a court's application of a demoralization framework to those instances
generally will result in fair outcomes, see Michelman, supra note 25, at 1219-23.
N° See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213-23; see also Baron, supra note 13, at 646-47.
2°7 See 533 U.S. 606,617 (2001); Mandelker, supra note 134, at 225.
208 See 533 U.S. at 626-30; see also supra notes 134-154 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's analysis of the threshold inquiry into whether a protected expectation exists).
209 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-30; cf. Fenster, supra note 13, at 669.
21° See 544 U.S. 533,538-39,542 (2005); Fenster, supra note 13, at 737-38.
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claim, as was the case in 1992 in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Conn-
ciL211 Based on the principles and language in Lucas, Palazzolo, and
Lingle, the Court now has the rhetorical tools to refine takings law with-
out disrupting precedent and to resolve some interbench disputes
about the role and substance of investment-backed expectations by af-
firming the centrality of investment-backed expectations in the straight-
forward Lucas con text. 212
A. Lingle Properly Focused the Court on Demoralization Cost-Creating
Factors as Determinative
In distinguishing and rejecting in the Fifth Amendment compen-
sation context a substantive, means-end due process analysis from a tak-
ings analysis, the unanimous Lingle Court distilled both the practical
touchstone and theoretical basis for Takings Clause compensation. 215
The practical touchstone of the different takings tests is an attempt to
identify those regulations that are tantamount to a physical appropria-
tion of property. 2 " The theoretical basis for compensation is that a citi-
zen should not be forced by the public to shoulder a burden of particu-
larly acute magnitude, of narrow distribution, or of an especially severe
character. 215 Although Lingle is addressed to takings law generally
rather than to a specific "vexing subsidiary question [1" within it, these
normative reasons for granting compensation have much significance
in shaping the Court's investment-backed expectations jurisprudence
211 Sec Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617; see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text. Compare Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), and Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 1999), with Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States (Palm Beach I), 231 F.3d
1354, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
212 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-30; id. at 632-36
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-19; see also infra notes 265-285 and
accompanying text.
213 See 544 U.S. at 539, 542. Clearly, a due process analysis is proper to test a regulation's
validity it is simply improper as a litmus test for Fifth Amendment compensation. See id. at
543. Compensation cannot validate a regulation that fails'a due process inquiry. See id.
211 See id. at 539. From a legal history viewpoint, regulatory takings are the direct de-
scendents of physical appropriations. See id.
215 Sec id. at 542. These factors are, perhaps unsurp.risingly, good analogues for the Penn
Central Transportation Co. u New York City analysis: diminution in value (magnitude), interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations (magnitude and distribution), and character of
the government action (character of the burden). Penn Cent. Transp. Co. s New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see Baron, supra note 13, at 650-51 (stating that the Court could
decide that the three Lingle factors are "subsumed in the Penn Central factors").
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in a way that comports with the initial principles behind investment-
backed expectations. 21 °
The magnitude, distribution, and character of the burden imposed
by regulations are, in effect, descriptions for the paradigm sources of
demoralization costs. 217 Citizens whose property is substantially bur-
dened by regulations that appear to be (or worse, are in fact) directed
specifically at their unique situation are rightly indignant and ask, "Why
me?"218 Compensating those negatively affected by a regulatory scheme
can assure citizens that the government is not acting deliberately to sin-
gle out holders of wealth for redistribution, or it can relieve the psycho-
logical pain caused by the imposition of a severe burden. 219 Absent
compensation, a reallocational choice that imposes a severe or not
widely shared burden necessarily creates relatively high demoralization
costs.22° For courts that need administrable standards, public choice
models serve as important proxies for demoralization costs engendered
by the theoretical concepts embodied in the general terms magnitude,
distribution, and character of the burden. 221 Although Madison's belief
218 See 544 U.S. at 539.
217 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1216-18; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (suggest-
ing that burdens of intensive magnitude are unlikely to be followed with a reciprocal bene-
fit, thus undergirding the categorical rule).
218 See Baron, supra note 13, at 647. Although a burden of substantial magnitude is re-
quired to generate sufficiently high demoralization costs to warrant compensation, see
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539-40, Michelman, supra note 25, at 1214-18, the primary focus of a
demoralization analysis is on the distribution of the burden—the "why me?" question, see
Baron, supra note 13, at 647; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1215-18 (stating that uncer-
tainty about potential loss is insufficient to generate demoralization costs because insur-
ance is sufficient to calm expectations; rather, the focus is on imputing to the majority
systematic exploitation of the claimant). The distribution analysis is not mathematical be-
cause demoralization costs are psychological, but courts can root out majoritarian exploi-
tation by looking to whether benefits of the regulation are reciprocal, or by reference to
special interest politics or exit and voice frameworks suggested by public choice theory. See
FISCIIEL, supra note 68, at 139, 182, 217; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1215-18. Obviously,
the narrower the distribution, the less difficult it would be for governments to achieve
settlements, making compensation questions all the more relevant to regulations that im-
pose a unique burden. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1217.
219 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1216 (stating that there is a difference, as it relates
to the genesis of demoralization, between losses (which necessarily result in redistribu-
tions) due to the random chance of, say, a natural disaster, as opposed to a deliberate
choice to reallocate wealth by those in society with governmental power).
"8 Sec id. at 1214-18; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
221 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43; supra notes 177-205 and accompanying text. Specifi-
cally, a claimant may demonstrate that majoritarian decision-making processes resulted in an
unfair distribution of regulatory effects or an unequal allocation of a particularly severe bur-
den with no concomitant benefit accruing to those affected. See supra notes 177-205 and
accompanying text. Or courts can be attuned to the hazards of special interest groups skew-
ing the distribution of regulatory effects. See supra notes 177-205 and accompanying text.
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in the ability of the federal structure to ward off the evils of majoritarian-
ism warrants deference,222 courts should be attuned to the specific haz-
ards public choice theory identifies: interest group politics and local
majoritarianism.223 Both of these process failures result in either bur-
dens of a severe magnitude or narrow distribution. 224
Contrary to the opinions of some commentators, by engaging in
an effects-of-the-regulation review directed at uncovering failed politi-
cal processes (and informed by public choice theory), the Court would
not be conducting a means-end process-based review. 225 Instead, a focus
on regulatory effects as applied to the claimant is a useful means to un-
cover those regulations that public choice theory empirically suggests
are indicative of failed political processes, which are the normative
heart of the takings compensation decision. 226 Indeed, the Court's re-
jection of a means-end "substantially advances" test was meant to distin-
guish substantive due process review under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments from Takings Clause compensation review, which is in-
formed by different theoretical and legal principles. 227
222 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 177-205 and accompanying text.
224 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43; see also SWIM notes 177-205 and accompanying text. In-
tuitively, burdens of significant magnitude and narrow distribution must go hand in hand to
generate demoralization costs that exceed settlement costs: if the burden is not severe, it is
too costly to compensate for "every such change in the general law" Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393,413 (1922). If the burden is severe, but also shared by thousands, it is also too
costly to compensate because of transaction costs. Michehnan, supra note 25, at 1176; see Lu-
cas, 505 U.S. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "generality" of the regulation
is determinative of the compensation question). Thus, only a combination of magnitude and
distribution of the burden unite to create sufficient demoralization costs such that it is
"cheaper" for society to simply compensate an affected property owner. See Michelman, supra
note 25, at 1215-18; cf. Echeverria, supra note 27, at 199-200. Additionally, a claimant who
fails the threshold inquiry into whether he or she actually has a protected expectation (for
example, because of notice of a regulation that reduced the purchase price of the property)
will not be demoralized because, in effect, such a claimant assumes the risk of devaluation
due to the regulation. See supra notes 193-198 and accompanying text; see also Palm Beach
Isles Assocs. v. United States (Palm Beach II), 231 F.3d 1365,1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Ga-
jarsaj, dissenting). Identifying the lack of demoralization costs accruing to speculators who
lose a gamble is a key safety-valve in the analysis, but the inquiry is inherently subtle and fact-
intensive. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Michelman, supra note
25, at 1238-40 & n.124 (stating that this inquiry requires "gingerly handling").
223 See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 13, at 700. The Court is clear that takings law is not de-
signed to evaluate the process directly, but the purpose of the Takings Clause is to remedy
failed political processes through constitutional protection. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43.
223 See supra notes 173-196 and accompanying text; see also FISCSIEL, supra note 68, at
139-40, 185; Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1690.
227 See Lingle, 599 U.S. at 542.
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Nothing about a demoralization cost takings jurisprudence in-
formed by public choice theory suggests that it is equivalent to substan-
tive due process review because such a method of review is properly
focused on the constitutional text, informed by the policies underlying
the Takings Clause, and comports with what limited originalist evidence
is available. 228 Even though the distinction between substantive due
process and a demoralization analysis may facially appear to be mini-
mal, the two are analytically distinct because public choice theory
merely provides administrable tools to govern the normative, text-based
constitutional question of whether to grant compensation in the face of
a valid regulatory action, while a means-end substantive due process
review is improperly focused on the constitutionality of the regulation
itself. 229
Lingle indicates that the Court is unifying the themes of different
takings tests around the principle articulated in the Court's 1960 deci-
sion in Armstrong v. United Stater that the Takings Clause is meant to
alleviate unjust allocations of burdens placed on property because the
public should bear the burdens it imposes on individuals for its own
benefit.238 In other words, the issue is fairness." 1 At the same time, the
Court did not develop a legal standard for determining fairness beyond
those articulated in Lucas, its 1978 decision in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New Yath City, and its 1982 decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan. CATV Carp.; the Court was concerned with a broader inquiry
into the purpose of the Takings Clause in the context finding the
proper approach to deciding takings claims. 232 Although Lingle is no
228 See id. at 542-ft see also supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
229 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-44; id. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (affirming that
substantive due process review, although distinct from Taking Clause review, survives):• cf.
Michelman, supra note 25, at 1215-18 (stating that a demoralization analysis is directed at
Fording a practical way to decide whether certain regulations require compensation and that
a purely subjective interview with property owners is obviously insufficient). The blurriness of
the distinction between substantive due process and takings review is likely due to the fact
that there is no bright line method to make the normative decision about whether to grant
compensation, see Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, outside of Professor Epstein's strong property
rights protection view; see EPSTEIN, Minn note 59, at 332-33. Because "[glovernment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law," Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413, we are left, neces-
sarily, with an "ad hoc, factual inquirtyl," Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
230 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-43 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)).
231 See id.; Fenster, supra note 13, at 695, 699-700.
232 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39, 542-44; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017; Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-37 (1982); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
124; Fenster, supra note 13, at 695, 699-700.
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panacea, at minimum it clarifies the law and reconnects takings dis-
course with the public's conception of the role of fairness and justice
embodied in constitutional principles. 233 Importantly, Lingle signals that
the Court may be finally ready to allow investment-backed expectations
to develop into the richly textured inquiry into fairness and efficiency
Michelman intended it to be. 234
B. Reading the Court's Takings Opinions Consistently with Demoralization
Cost Analysis Results in Doctrinal Coherence
Since Penn Central the Court has proliferated different takings
tests for different factual situations, 235 Lingle distilled legal principles
that apply equally across those different tests, thereby clarifying the
law. 238 The Court can move a step closer to doctrinal clarity by applying
those decisional principles to the dispute about whether investment-
backed expectations are an element of a total wipeout analysis. 237 In
light of Lingle and a full understanding of investment-backed expecta-
tions' fundamental principles, 238 the dispute over including investment-
backed expectations in a total taking claim analysis should be resolved
in favor of including the test because its inclusion would result in
greater intellectual consistency and doctrinal coherence in takings
law. 239
233 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39; Baron, supra note 13, at 646-48,651-54.
234 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539, 542; Baron, supra note 13, at 647-48. The preceding dis-
cussion does not presuppose that burdens must impact an existing use: an expectation
may be protected. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-19; Penn Cent„ 438 U.S. at 124-25; Michel-
man, supra note 25, at 1213,1244 (analogizing the protection of property expectations to
the celebrated Mown v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805), decision because the legal wrong is a
deliberate interference with another's crystallized expectations). Although deciding such
questions may be intuitively straightforward to one individual, the lack of clear rules and
shared norms about property expectations makes the application of the first step in the
analysis, defining what a protectable expectation is, a difficult task for courts. See Man-
delker, supra note 134, at 225-26. The Court's Palazzolo decision, and specifically Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, added some clarity to defining an expectation, but by no means
has the Court conclusively decided upon a legal formula. See 533 U.S. at 632-36
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
235 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.
236 See id. at 539, 542-43; see also supra notes 213-216 and accompanying text.
237 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015,1019.
238 See Lingle 544 U.S. at 542-43; see also supra notes 213-234 and accompanying text
(discussing the foundational principles behind Michelman's investment-backed expecta-
tions analysis).
259 See infra notes 261-294 and accompanying text.
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1. The Federal Circuit's Strong Rhetoric Lacks Intellectual Foundations
The dissent from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit's 2000 denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in Palm Beach Isles
Associates v. United States was correct in stating that investment-backed
expectations are an integral part of a Lucas-type case, but for the
wrong—or at least incomplete—reasons. 20 By the same token, the Palm
Beach panel's reading of Lucas as rejecting an inquiry into investment-
backed expectations is theoretically flawed on its face because a legal
test that looks only at the magnitude of the burden is alone an insuffi-
cient—albeit important—indicator of a failed process for which the
Constitution requires compensation."' Moreover, the panel's reading
of the investment-backed expectations requirement overlooks its pur-
pose: the opinion suggests that including investment-backed expecta-
tions will affect the amount of compensation awarded, when, in fact,
that is a wholly distinct question to which the test is simply not di-
rected.242 - Instead, it is directed at determining whether to grant com-
pensation by way of a demoralization cost analysis, not how much is to
be granted.243
Structurally, as the judge dissenting from the denial of a rehearing
of Palm Beach en banc correctly noted, Lucas only precluded a balanc-
ing of the government interest and the private burden when the mag-
nitude of such a burden results in the denial of all economically bene-
ficial use, 244 The Palm Beach dissent, however, only partially articulates
the affirmative reasons why investment-backed expectations should be
included in every regulatory takings case.245 The dissent's focus is on
245 See Palm Beach 11, 231 F.3d at 1367-69; infra notes 244-249 and accompanying text.
441 See Palm Beach I, 231 F.3d at 1364; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1218. Obviously, the
magnitude of the burden is a very important part of either the utilitarian or the fairness
calculation. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1191. In fact, magnitude is so important that
it has its own prong in the Penn Central analysis: the First one. See 438 U.S. at 124. But if the
proposition is accepted that the Constitution requires compensation based on antimajori-
tarian policies, not mere adjustment of benefits and burdens, then factors beyond magni-
tude are also relevant. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text. Of particular rele-
vance may be the ability of property owners to exit the market or influence the process,
thereby lowering demoralization costs of government regulation. See Ftscum„ supra note
68, ar 324; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1218; sec also supra notes 170-205 and accompany-
ing text (discussing public choice theory's application to this thorny area).
242 See Palm Beach 1, 231 F.3d at 1363.
243 See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-15; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213-18; see also
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-39,542.
244 See Palm Beach II, 231 F.3d at 1368 (Gajarsaj., dissenting) ("Lucas never removed or
modified the necessary second criterion—investment-backed expectations.").
243 See id. at 1369-70 (discussing only the notice function of the threshold analysis,
which can militate against a reliance argument in favor of demonstrating high demoraliza-
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the threshold question in investment-backed expectations analysis: is
there an expectation that should be protected? 246 Although that ques-
tion has befuddled courts, the investment-backed expectations analysis
is deeper and more textured than that single question. 247 The dissent-
ing judge never discussed the normative core of the Takings Clause
analysis inherent in investment-backed expectations: whether the regu-
lation imposed sufficient demoralization costs to warrant compensa-
tion. 248 Thus, although the dissenting judge's argument to include in-
vestment-backed expectations is facially and structurally valid, it is un-
supported by compelling reasoning to include the test. 249
2. Rereading Lucas After Lingle's Elaboration
Fortunately, a close reading of Lucas with an understanding of the
foundations underneath the investment-backed expectations analysis
fills this analytical gap in the Palm Beach dispute. 25° Moreover, in light of
Lingle's conceptual marshalling, Lucas stands on firmer ground itself
because its reasoning is, implicitly; consistent with a demoralization cost
compensation rule. 2n
The Lucas Court focuses much of its rhetorical energy on a discus-
sion of the threshold expectations analysis: 252 Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Lucas deals at length with the "background principles" ex-
ception to the categorical rule advanced in the case. 253 This discussion
draws a bright line in the definition of what expectations are not pro-
Lion costs); cf. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); supra notes 143-
154 and accompanying text. Although Judge Gajarsa references Justice Kennedy's Lucas
concurrence to support his point, Justice Kennedy's opinion suffers from precisely the
same fault: it discusses only the threshold analysis which defines the protected expectation,
not the deeper, normative demoralization analysis. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032-36 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment); infra notes 258-260 and accompanying text.
446 See Palm Beach g 231 F.3d at 1369-70 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). The primary func-
tion of this step is to weed out those claims from speculators seeking a windfall. See supra
notes 143-154 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 150-162 and accompanying text.
"5 See Palm Beach II, 231 F.3d at 1369-70 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). It is difficult to fault
the opinion for failing to do so; the Supreme Court, too, has failed in this endeavor. See,
e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; see also supra notes 158-169 and accompanying text.
249 See Palm Beach II, 231 F.3d at 1369-70 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
230 See infra notes 251-313 and accompanying text.
251 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542-44 (discussing magnitude and distribution as determina-
tive conceptual factors); Lucas,  505 U.S. at 1014-19; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1214-18.
232 See 505 U.S. at 1027-32; cf. supra notes 150-157 and accompanying text.
sss See505 U.S. at 1027-32.
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tected: inherent limitations on the title to property, based on the state's
traditional common law of property and nuisance. 254
Thus, if a government regulation completely eliminates the value
of property, but if that regulation merely prohibits a use that was oth-
erwise illegal, no compensation is due under Lucas because the gov-
ernment did not "take" anything the owner could have reasonably re-
lied upon.255 Indeed, Justice Scalia elaborated on the scope of his view
of what expectations are constitutionally protected in his Palazzolo con-
currence. 256 There, he indicated that notice of a regulation is, in his
view, an immaterial consideration when considering a takings claim
because the only relevant factor in shaping protected expectations is
the state's background law of property and nuisance. 257
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Lucas, agreed with
Justice Scalia on the general principle that the Constitution does not
provide absolute protection to all property rights, but Kennedy's view
of the scope of the limitations on (or exceptions to) constitutional
property protection is somewhat wider. 258 Justice Kennedy's opinion
referenced investment-backed expectations as the relevant defining test
to determine those property interests for which the Fifth Amendment
guarantees compensation in the event of a taking. 259 This use of in-
vestment-backed expectations is only partially correct because it fails to
move beyond the threshold definitional question of what rights are
protected and into the normative demoralization cost analysis. 260
254 See id. at 1029.
255 See id.
256 See 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
257 See Id.
256 See 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor
agreed that the scope of Fifth Amendment property protection is defined through a factual
inquiry into the owner's expectations. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
259 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1039-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Scalia's stricter protection of property rights is nonetheless factually based because he
would grant the government greater latitude to regulate personal property than real prop-
erty. See id. at 1027-28 (majority opinion). This view is rooted in making determinations
about property based on tradition or history, rather than, as Michelman would rather it be,
based on economic expectations. Compare id. (grounding concept of property in tradi-
tional state law principles), with Michelman, supra note 25, at 1211-12 (grounding prop-
erty as utilitarian concept).
260 See supra notes 134-198 and accompanying text.
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Although the determination about what rights are protected is
necessary to a well-developed demoralization cost analysist261 no
 par-
ticular resolution is necessary to engage in the more important, norma-
tive component of the investment-backed expectations analysis. 262 All
that matters is that courts make a determination about where constitu-
tional protection stops (so as to avoid windfalls to speculators, for ex-
ample), and do so consistendy. 263
Nevertheless, even as the Lucas Court was sidetracked with de-
termining the scope of constitutional protection, it implicitly recog-
nized the normative components of a demoralization cost analysis in
formulating its "categorical" rule. 264 Although the explicit language of
the decision focused purely on the diminution in value component of
a takings claim, the reasoning of the opinion did not rely on diminu-
tion in value as per se constitutionally compensable. 265 Instead, Justice
Scalia drew upon James Madison's antimajoritarianism goa1 266 to sup-
port the Lucas compensation rule. 267 In the complete elimination of
value context, there is a "heightened risk that private property is be-
ing pressed into some form of public service." 268
Avoiding that abuse of governmental power is the goal of the Lucas
test, and the decision employs a demoralization cost-type test to con-
261 See supra notes 150-157 and accompanying text; cf. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 ("'For
what is the land but the profits thereof?'" (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES ch. 1, § 1 (1st
Ant. ed. 1812))).
262 See supra notes 150-157 and accompanying text.
263 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In the sense that Lucas
pushed the definition of protected property further than it previously had been, commen-
tators have called the decision a victory for private landowners. See Laura S. Underkuffler,
Tahoe 's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property and Justice, 21 CONST, COMMENT.
727,727,730 (2004). Although the gravity of this issue is not to be understated because it
has important practical ramifications, the analytical importance of that increased protec-
tion is nil: as this Note argues, Lucas may now be seen as more important for properly bas-
ing its reasoning on a demoralization framework that Lingle also accepts. See infra notes
269-281 and accompanying text.
2" See 505 U.S. at 1017,1019 n.8.
263 See id. at 1017-19. justice Scalia rightly did not solely rely on the magnitudinal issue
because that alone is an insufficient normative reason to grant compensation. See Michel-
man, supra note 25, at 1218. The important analytical point is that although a complete
diminution in value is "determinative" in a Lucas case, the reason why it is determinative has
not been so clearly laid out by the Court. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017—
19.
266 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
267 See 505. U.S. at 1018.
266 Id.
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nect its reasoning with that underlying policy goa1. 269 Lucas states first
that when a regulation eliminates a piece of property's value, courts will
not simply assume that the legislature is acting evenhandedly such that
property owners can reasonably expect to receive as much value as they
lost, postregulation. 2" This risk of disproportionate, inherently redis-
tributive burdens being placed on property owners with no reciprocal
advantage is precisely the evil that property law seeks to mitigate in or-
der to encourage investment. 271 Indeed, an important component of
Michelman's normative rule is that demoralization costs are likely to be
high when systematic redistributive choices can be imputed to majority
decision makers. 272 One way that such a choice is easily, or at least intui-
tively, apparent is through a regulation that severely diminishes the sub-
ject property's value. 273 On a broader scale, public choice theory em-
pirically and theoretically identifies those situations where courts
should be most probing because of the risks of such redistributive
choices. 274 Thus, one reading of Lucas indicates that it merely applied
an intuitive utilitarian approach when formulating its categorical test to
make the compensation decision by determining that complete elimi-
nations of value result in high demoralization costs. 275
Lucas's reasoning comports with a demoralization analysis on an-
other ground: it relies on avoiding demoralization costs imposed
through "singling out" as the primary reason to grant compensation in
total wipeout cases. 276 The psychological effect of being singled out by
the state to bear a burden personally for the benefit of the rest of soci-
ety is the essence of demoralization costs. 277 This analytical step is the
266 See id. at 1017-19; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213-16. The issue of how to con-
nect a real-world test to the underlying policy goals of the Takings Clause has bedeviled
commentators for over a generation. Compare Sax, supra note 48, at 61-62 (suggesting, in
1964, that compensation is due when the government acts as an enterprise), with Rose,
supra note 59, at 562 n.6 (listing, in 1984, different approaches. none of which is determi-
native).
270 See 505 U.S. at 1017-18.
271 See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the law pro-
tects "private expectations to ensure private investment"); Michelman, supra note 25, at
1212-13.
272 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1217.
276 See id. at 1230-31.
274 See supra notes 176-194 and accompanying text.
276 See 505 U.S. at 1017-18; Michelman, supra note 25, at 1229-35.
276 See 505 U.S. at 1019 ("11V] hen the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice ad/ economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good ... he has suffered a
taking." (second emphasis added)).
277 See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1216-17 ("[T]here must be at work a tacit assump-
tion that losses which seem the proximate results of deliberate collective decision have a spe-
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core of Lucas's categorical rule and is the link between it, Michelman,
and the antimajoritarian policy underlying the Takings Clause. 278
Moreover, the particular process failures identified empirically by pub-
lic choice theory suggest that Lucas was right in searching for effects
that indicate the existence of the evils meant to be avoided by the Tak-
ings Clause's protection.279
 The analytical shortfall of Lucas is merely
that it took a logical shortcut in not explicitly laying out the founda-
tional reasoning behind its categorical treatment. 280 That lack of an ex-
plicit logical foundation is the source of the intellectual inconsistency
that has marred the Court's takings jurisprudence. 281
In essence, the reasoning behind Lucas's categorical rule lies in
two key statements: (1) "[w] hen no productive or economically benefi-
cial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual as-
sumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life,'" and (2) "there are good reasons for our fre-
quently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good .. , he has suffered a taking. "282 Those two state-
ments suggest that the Court simply views such severe regulations as
.cial counterproductive potency beyond any which may be contained in other kinds of
losses.").
278 se
, id.; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019; THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 59, at 60;
supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 176-194 and accompanying text; cf. Gaba, supra note 58, at 589-90
(suggesting that distributive justice concerns militate against allowing the government to
single out property owners, but that the Court has not adopted a clear distributive justice
approach).
22° See 505 U.S. at 1017-19.
281 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 ("[O]ur regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be
characterized as unified"). Lucas contended that it was not inventing a new legal rule but
merely applying past precedent. 505 U.S. at 1016 11.6. If the Lucas majority is faithful to its
statement, the above analysis may give some consistency to a historically incoherent area of
constitutional law. Sce Gaba, supra note 58, at 569.
282 See 505 U.S. at 1017-19. The fact that Lucas focuses exclusively on real property
provides further evidence that the Court made a judgment that regulations depriving land
of all economic value are simply a very good proxy for demoralization costs. See id. at
1027-28. First of all, real property is immobile, so demoralization costs cannot be limited
by exit from a jurisdiction. See FISCIIEL, supra note 68, at 324. Moreover, real estate invest-
ments tend to be substantial and typically account for the largest portion of an individual's
net worth. See WILLIAM A. Ftscitta., THE. HOMEVOTER FlyromEsis 4 (2001). Traditionally,
the law accorded more freedom to use and enjoy real property than personalty, so a court
may see impinging on that traditional freedom as more egregious. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1027-28. There is also something different in kind about real estate, given that it is tangi-
ble, that may make the intuitive judgment that some process went awry more reasonable
because people—or at least the Court—attach(es) more psychological value to being able
to employ real estate as they see fit. Cf, Ruiz, supra note 96, at 1331-39.
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easily identifiable situations where the legislature improperly ignored
the high demoralization costs that accompany a complete wipeout of a
tangible and extensive investment in real estate and should have in-
stead compensated the regulatory victim. 2  Although it did not state its
reasoning explicitly, the Court relies on a demoralization cost analysis
to reach its result, but, in doing so implicitly, it suggests—improperly---
thatmagnitude of the burden alone is sufficient to identify high de-
moralization costs situations. 2M Although magnitude is important, and
probably determinative, there are other factors at play in the analysis.28B
3. Glossing the Past: Penn Central as Consistent with Michelman
In light of Lingle's thematic distillation, even Penn Central appears
to have focused, rhetorically at least, on a demoralization analysis as the
normative basis for making a decision. 286 The Penn Central majority con-
trasted the regulation at issue, which the majority characterized as a .
broad, comprehensive measure affecting hundreds of parcels, with spot
zoning, a scheme in which certain parcels of property are singled out
by lawmakers. 287 Indeed, the Court noted that the regulation supplies a
reciprocal benefit—economically to the property and aesthetically to
the citizens—and defers to legislative judgment. 288 Although the Court
acknowledged that the impact of the regulation was not completely
uniform and that the law likely had a more severe impact on the claim-
ant than others, it did not view the effects of the regulation as indicative
of a flawed process. 289 Therefore, given that the Court viewed the bur-
den as shared and the severity of it minimal, it did not see the requisite
demoralization costs to grant compensation. 29°
Justice Rehnquist's dissent exposed an analytical flaw in this rea-
soning: the determination that the regulatory effects are not severe
283 See Nlichelman, supra note 25, at 1191,1213-18,1234.
281 See id.; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-19.
285 See Lingle, 549 U.S. at 542-43 (magnitude, distribution, and character of the burden
as the relevant factors in Takings Clause analysis); Michelman, supra note 25, at 1191,
1213-18, 1234; see also FiscHEL, supra note 68, at 324 (discussing exit and voice as other
considerations); cf. Palm Beach I, 231 F.3d at 1364 n.4.
256 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 132-39.
257 See id. at 132.
255 See id. at 134-35.
288 See id. at 133-35. The Penn Central Court's focus on the determination made by the
city council is worth noting because it connects the determination it makes as to regula-
tory effects with its deference to the political process. See id. This nexus between effects
and process is what public choice theorists have suggested is the key to unlocking the tak-
ings puzzle. See supra notes 170-206 and accompanying text.
288 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132-35.
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enough to warrant judicial interference (because there is no indication
of high demoralization costs) is somewhat arbitrary. 291
 To the dissent,
the regulation did single out these property owners and inflict demor-
alization costs for Which compensation should be paid because a sig-
nificant amount of value was destroyed, and the owners now have an
affirmative duty to keep their property in good repair. 292 The dissent
recognized that regulations that do not single out property owners and
inflict a severe burden do not require compensation because they do
not impose inefficiencies through demoralization costs. 293 In short, the
majority and dissent simply disagreed about the extent and distribution
of the burden, or, put another way, about the extent to which the regu-
lation interferes with investment-backed expectations, properly under-
stood. 294
4. Possibilities for a Coherent Approach
Faced with this disagreement, it is reasonable to ask whether a de-
moralization analysis can be administrable in court. 295 Lucas can be ap-
plauded for attempting to bring predictability and bright line rules to
this gray area of Iaw. 295
 In doing so, however, the Supreme Court re-
treated from doctrinal coherence and muddied the waters of its juris-
prudence by compounding the number and nature of expressed legal
tests when, in fact, the normative principles remain the same across
regulatory takings tests. 297
 If the Court were to explicitly adopt an in-
vestment-backed expectations analysis that actually comported with the
foundational principles behind the doctrine, it would not'be departing
from precedent or principle. 298
 Moreover, public choice theory sup-
plies the necessary intellectual tools to properly engage in a demorali-
491 See id. at 138-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
292 See id. at 138-40,146.
193 See id. at 147.
261 See id. at 133-35 (majority opinion); id. at 138-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1.11 See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text.
296 See 505 U.S. at 1019.
262 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539,542.
296 See id.; supra notes 93-133 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court already em-
barks on a similar analysis in equal protection cases. See, e.g., VIII. of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562,563-65 (2000) (stating that plaintiffs, who were denied municipal water ser-
vice because of alleged ill-will from city officials following an unrelated lawsuit, could chal-
lenge the city's actions as a "class of one" under the Equal Protection Clause on the
ground that they were intentionally treated differently from others).
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zation cost analysis without complicated valuation issues because the
overarching focus is on fairness principles.299
Because takings law has spawned numerous, alternative legal tests
given its complexity, adopting investment-backed expectations as the
decisional fulcrum can bring much-needed doctrinal consistency to
Fifth Amendment takings law. 300 More importantly, embracing a de-
moralization cost investment-backed expectations analysis would be
normatively superior because it would support efficient outcomes that
are also fair."'
Therefore, the Court should adopt an investment-backed expec-
tations analysis, with its variables informed by public choice princi-
299 See FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 216-17.
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Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-40; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617. Although adopting an in-
vestment-backed expectations test would enhance doctrinal consistency, it does not avoid
the issue raised by justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central: the test still requires judges
to decide whether the political process improperly ignored demoralization costs to escape
the constitutional duty to compensate. See supra notes 291-294 and accompanying text.
One possible answer is that judges are good at making these determinations, and the law
should allow them to do so as a matter of institutional competency. See Michelman, supra
note 25, at 1248-53; see also Fenster, supra note 13, at 730,739. But this judgment should
not be left to courts alone; all branches should exercise their power faithfully to the consti-
tutional charge. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1248-53. Some commentators suggest,
through public choice theory, helpful analytical tools to limit judicial activism. See supra
notes 170-196 and accompanying text. Others see the Court's role as an extremely limited,
legal process review, which is antithetical to making judgments about demoralization be-
cause it is deferential to the political process. See Fenster, supra note 13, at 734-39. But cf.
Eagle, supra note 13, at 947-50 (arguing for substantive due process review of takings), But
if the point of takings compensation is to safeguard against failed processes, see supra notes
57-71 and accompanying text, the Constitution would appear to mandate a role for the
judiciary, see infra note 308; cf. Eagle, supra note 13, at 947-50.
301 See supra notes 103-127 and accompanying text; see also Fische! & Shapiro, supra
note 120, at 277,292 (stating that the utilitarian criterion is "consistent with principles of
economic efficiency," but noting that such a result is also fair). Whether the Court does so
using the sometimes-maligned term "investment-backed expectations" or the trilogy em-
ployed in Lingle is immaterial because each set of factors evaluates similar, if not the same,
set of issues; what is important is achieving the best possible normative law. See Lingle, 544
U.S. at 538-39, 542-43; Fische! & Shapiro, supra note 120, at 292. "Investment-backed ex-
pectations" may be a better choice, however, because the terminology itself does not lend
itself to oversimplification in practical application, as might be the case with straightfor-
ward terms like magnitude and distribution. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1248-53.
The inquiry is factually textured and subtle. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634-36 (O'Connor, j.,
concurring) (regarding the first prong of the investment-backed expectations analysis);
Michelman, supra note 25, at 1213-18 (regarding the more difficult demoralization
prong). Therefore, a balance must be struck between educating the bar about the nature
of the substantive legal inquiry and using terrninology'that, due to its simplicity, lends itself
to intellectual abuse and distortion over time. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1248-50.
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pies, in cases where the claim is a complete elimination of vahte. 3"
Such an approach may allow governments to show that noncompen-
sation is, in fact, the preferred outcome when a regulation, although
imposing a total wipeout, does not cause demoralization costs in ex-
cess of settlement costs. 303 This could occur, for example, in justice
Brandeis's example where compensation would not be due to a coal
operation that is shuttered because its operation releases poisonous
gases.904 Such a regulation would impose high settlement costs in
terms of the property's market value but low demoralization costs in
terms of lost future productivity and innovation due to the fact that it
is not an arbitrary exercise of raw power over a minority interest. 305
The doctrinal problem in takings law is that no mathematical for-
mula can be applied to assess fairness. 306
 The issues are complicated,
and a proper judicial review of the facts will be intensive, subtle, and,
admittedly, difficult. 307 But the truism that fairness is not mathematical
does not mean that courts should abdicate their role in making fairness
determinations in takings cases,3" What is important is to agree on
clear judicial principles so that claimants and governments can better
predict results, litigate effectively, and plan accordingly. 3°9 Lingle's clari-
302 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-19; Ftscnct., supra note 68, at 216-17; Michelman, supra
note 25, at 1213-18,1248-50, Of course, acknowledging the role of investment-backed ex-
pectations in a total taking claim softens the "categorical" nature of the Lucas decision. See
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. But Lucas was never absolutely categorical to
begin with it always excepted regulations that prohibited uses that never inhered in the ti-
de—an exception with an unclear scope. See 505 U.S. at 1029; Blais, supra note 47, at 3-6.
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	 Michelman, supra note 25, at 1214.
304 See Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
305 See Michela-tan, supra note 25, at 1214-18.
306 See id. at 1250.
307 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Michelman, supra note
25, at 1250.
See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1248-50. Indeed, in many ways, courts are particu-
larly suited for the nuanced, factual inquiries required to properly undertake the demoraliza-
tion analysis and should therefore do so as a matter of institutional competency. See id.; cf.
Fenster, supra note 13, at 729. Such a role for courts comports with the checks and balances
inherent in our system because judicial review of majoritarian processes may be the only
safety valve to protect minority interests. See Michelman, supra note 25, at 1248-50. That said,
deference to majoritarian decision-making processes is probably a more prudent course of
action unless regulatory effects fairly clearly indicate a process failure as suggested by public
choice theorists. See FISCHEL, supra note 68, at 42-44; cf. Fenster, supra note 13, at 734-36;
Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1690. There are legitimate disagreements about the level of judi-
cial activism that is desirable. See Fenster, supra note 13, at 730 n.307; Michelman, supra note
25, at 1250. What is beyond dispute, and what is supported by constitutional text, is that there
is a role for courts in requiring compensation for property owners who have their property
excessively appropriated for public use. See U.S. CONST. amend. V
3" See Fenster, supra note 13, at 727-28,730-32.
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fication is a step in the right direction.") The Court can go one step
further by affirming the centrality of investment-backed expectations in
a clear cut, easy case: a total wipeout."' The same reasons why Lucas
intuitively reached its compensation result are those suggested by the
fundamental commentary that generated the term." 2 And, for those
interested in outcomes, the application of investment-backed expecta-
tions in a Lucas situation is unlikely to alter the results that would oth-
erwise be achieved through the application of the categorical rule. 313
CONCLUSION
Investment-backed expectations analysis has been defined by ob-
fuscation. The Supreme Court has not articulated a normative princi-
ple behind investment-backed expectations, although it has dealt with
the question of what expectations are constitutionally protected.
The Court's 2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron. U.S.A., Inc. made
significant strides in clarifying the doctrinal law of the Takings Clause
and the policy supporting it. Specifically, Lingle indicates that the Tak-
ings Clause is designed to compensate those individuals who are forced
to shoulder a burden of disproportionate magnitude and narrow dis-
tribution for the benefit of the public as a whole. This magnitude and
distribution of the burden formulation is similar to the principles un-
derlying Professor Frank Michelman's articulation of "investment-
backed expectations" because it, in effect, focuses on demoralization
cost-creating policies. Demoralization costs arise specifically from the
decision by the government not to compensate a property owner who is
faced with a regulation that diminishes his or her property value. Just as
Michelman would compensate when demoralization costs exceed the
costs of simply compensating a burdened property owner for his or her
loss because it is more efficient for society to incur the lowest cost of a
policy choice, the Lingle Court indicates that the Takings Clause man-
dates a similar result on "fairness and justice" grounds. In addition, a
demoralization cost approach to investment-backed expectations is
510 544 U.S. at 536-43; see Fenster, supra note 13, at 737; see also Baron, supra note 13, at
646,650.
311 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. Applying the demoralization analysis explicitly is diffi-
cult, but introducing the concept in a straightforward, extreme case would alleviate some
of the practical difficulties in introducing such a nuanced analysis explicitly. Sec Michel-
man, supra note 25, at 1250-51.
312 See 505 U.S. at 1017-19; Michelman, supra note 25. at 1234.
515 See Palm Beach 1, 231 F.3d at 1364 n.4.
912	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:865
demonstrably fair as well as economically efficient. Thus, such an ap-
proach is normatively superior.
Given the general hesitation to approach fairness problems
mathematically, the Court's reluctance to engage in an investment-
backed expectation analysis, as defined by the words on their face, is
understandable. Nevertheless, the actual principles behind the test be-
lie the superficial meaning of the phrase. Moreover, public choice the-
ory provides the Court with analytical tools to determine those situa-
tions deserving of compensation from those not under investment-
backed expectations analysis,
In light of Lingle's philosophical clarification, the Court's previous
takings decisions appear to comport with the principles behind Michel-
man's efficiency-fairness formulation of investment-backed expectations.
Because the Court has the tools to engage in such an analysis, it should
do so in a case where the variables are clear: a total wipeout. Affirming
the role of investment-backed expectations in a total taking claim analy-
sis would further Lingle's clarification of takings law without departing
from precedent or constitutional text. The Court ought to take advan-
tage of Lingle to further settle a historically convoluted area of constitu-
tional law.
JOHN A. KUPIEC
